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ABSTRACT

Given the economic ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ cycle associated with natural resource
extraction, the decision to spend or save the revenue generated by such activity (which is
considered a financial windfall), has important policy implications. Two streams of
literature exist which help to explain and predict the behaviors of those facing such
payments. One of these streams contends that the size of a windfall payment is inversely
related to consumption. More specifically, this stream posits that as the size of a windfall
in proportion to an individual or household’s budget increases, consumption of the
windfall decreases. This study attempted to test this contention in the public arena by
examining three counties in Pennsylvania that received windfall payments from a newly
established natural gas impact fee.
Through interviews with public officials familiar with the payment decisionmaking process and an examination of archival materials from Clearfield, Greene, and
Tioga Counties, this study found that windfall size is inversely related to consumption.
Clearfield County, which received the smallest payment relative to the total budget of the
county, intended to spend most of the windfall while Tioga County, which received the
largest payment relative to the total budget, intended to save most of the payment. Greene
County, which received a medium-sized payment, also intended to spend most of the
windfall.
Furthermore, the study revealed that officials in Clearfield County largely
perceived the payment to be an insubstantial cash “bonus” with limited investment
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opportunities. Officials in Greene County considered the payment additional income and
planned to use the payment to fund various projects. Only Tioga County considered the
payment a substantial sum and insisted that the payment be saved.
This study concludes that the stream of literature focused on windfall size proves
applicable in the public arena. Furthermore, this study contends that given a better
understanding of the perceptions of and attitudes toward the payment, policymakers in
Clearfield and Greene Counties should alter current behaviors. In the future, jurisdictions
facing windfall payments in Pennsylvania and elsewhere should be more prudent in the
decision-making process in order to account for the long-term effects of resource
extraction on the local economy as well as the impacts of the impending resource ‘bust’.
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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, natural gas extraction in Pennsylvania has grown extensively.
With trillions of cubic feet of natural gas available as a part of the Marcellus Shale
Formation, extraction is expected to continue to grow in the near future (Andrews, et al.,
2009). As a result, Pennsylvania anticipates having a greater role in satisfying the
nation’s energy needs while creating jobs and growing a stronger economy. However, the
lifespan of the natural gas extraction industry, like many other non-renewable resource
extraction industries, is uncertain. A sudden fall in demand or an accelerated depletion
rate of natural gas reserves may cause the industry to falter. If Pennsylvania relies too
heavily on natural gas and the industry collapses, the state’s economy could experience
significant adverse effects including high unemployment and considerable long-term debt
(Ross, 1999).
In addition to the economic risk associated with the prodigiousness of natural gas
extraction as an economic driver, the industry imposes significant negative externalities.
Already, communities with natural gas development complain of deteriorating roads and
infrastructure as a result of extraction. Citizens also worry that hydraulic fracturing for
natural gas or ‘fracking’ may have adverse effects on the environment. Concerns over
water pollution in extraction communities, for example, are not uncommon. In an effort
to address these issues and provide a return for communities, lawmakers in the state of
Pennsylvania enacted an impact fee for natural gas wells in February of 2012. Funds
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generated by the impact fee, established under the legislation known as Act 13, may be
used by counties and municipalities to address some or all of these issues.
The language of Act 13 regarding usage of funds does not explicitly limit counties
and municipalities to addressing such issues, however. While the legislation established
thirteen approved or state-sanctioned spending categories for the revenue, the categories
are broadly defined. Consequently, counties and municipalities may use the funds for
various purposes ranging from building parks to cutting taxes to expanding human
services. The thirteen approved categories as listed on the fund usage report required by
the legislation are shown in the table below. At the time this study was conducted, the
allocations of the funds were available for only a fraction of local governments. Thus, the
number of jurisdictions choosing to save or spend the revenue had yet to be determined.
If spent, the funds may be used to address the externalities associated with extraction,
promote economic diversification, saved for capital improvements, or any other number
of uses.
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Table 1- PUC Fund Usage Report

CATEGORY

AMOUNT
(rounded to the
nearest hundred)

1. Construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of roadways,
bridges and public infrastructure.
2. Water, storm water and sewer systems, including construction,
reconstruction, maintenance and repair
3. Emergency preparedness and public safety, including law enforcement
and fire services, hazardous material response, 911, equipment acquisition
and other services
4. Environmental programs, including trails, parks and recreation, open
space, flood plain management, conservation districts and agricultural
preservation
5. Preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and water
supplies
6. Tax reductions, including homestead exclusions
7. Projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing to
residents
8. Records management, geographic information systems and information
technology
9. The delivery of social services
10. Judicial services
11. Deposit into the municipality’s capital reserve fund if the funds are used
solely for a purpose set forth in Act 13 of 2012
12. Career and technical centers for training of workers in the oil and gas
industry
13. Local or regional planning initiatives under the act of July 31, 1968 (P.L.
805, No. 247), known as the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
TOTAL

Because the funds were not expected before 2012 and the future of such payments
is not guaranteed, the funds made available by the law may be regarded as a windfall
payment (Widerquist & Howard, 2012). While much of this literature regarding natural
resource windfalls has an international focus, a vast body of literature exploring windfall
payments in the United States from other sources (e.g. tobacco master settlement
agreements, unexpected benefit payments, etc.) exists. Within this body, at least two
distinct streams emerge. One stream, pulled primarily from the field of public budgeting,

3

largely leaves windfall payment decision-making undistinguished from non-windfall
payment decision-making and suggests that such payments are subject to the same
political processes as other funds. Thus, the stream emphasizes the importance of
citizens, groups, and external factors in the decision-making process for windfall
payments. More specifically, researchers within this stream contend that citizens,
lobbyists, and politicians as well as environmental concern/awareness, fiscal stress,
intergovernmental budget cuts, and social discontent all influence the decision to spend
or save windfalls (Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981; Sloan, Carlisle, Rattliff, &
Trogdon, 2005)1. Furthermore, if spent, these factors significantly influence how the
funds are allocated (Cutler, Elmendorf, & Zeckhauser, 1993; Jordan, 2003).
Another stream, adapted from economics and more specifically behavioral
economics, emphasizes the importance of the size of the windfall payment in the
decision-making processes (Keeler, James, & Abdel-Ghany, 1985; Milkman, Beshears,
Rogers, & Bazerman, 2007; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). To be more specific, research
studies of individuals and households suggest that windfalls that are small in proportion
to an individual or household’s total income are typically spent rather than saved with the
converse being true for windfalls that are large in proportion to an individual or
household’s total income (Keeler, James, & Abdel-Ghany, 1985; Milkman, Beshears,
Rogers, & Bazerman, 2007). A possible explanation for this tendency is that individuals
use “mental accounting” models in the decision-making process for windfall payments.
In this “mental accounting” model, windfalls may be viewed as ‘bonuses’ to be spent
1

See also Arnett, 2012; Cutler, Elmendorf, & Zeckhauser, 1993; Garrick, Johnson, & Neiman, 2009; Hite
& Ulbrich, 1986; Jordan, 2003; Pammer, 1990; Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010.
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(Milkman, Beshears, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2007; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). Although this
stream has been limited in scope to the behaviors of individuals and households and not
collective or public decision-making, applications of such an approach to the public arena
are worth exploring (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011). If applied to public
decision-making, one might replace the individual with the jurisdiction and total income
with a jurisdiction’s total budget.
This study explored the two streams of literature and attempted to bring clarity to
the discussion regarding saving and spending patterns for the payments to jurisdictions in
Pennsylvania. Specifically, this study attempted to test the notion that windfall size as
well as the recognition of a payment as a ‘bonus’ are primary determinants of a
jurisdiction’s propensity to spend or consume. Following the logic of this stream of
literature, counties with a large payout relative to the size of the overall budget should
consider the funds an investment opportunity and save all or most of the revenue
generated. Conversely, counties with small payouts relative to the size of the overall
budget should consider the payment a ‘bonus’ and spend all or most of the funds.
In order to test this notion, three Pennsylvania counties that received windfall
payments were examined. Those included in the study were Clearfield, Greene, and
Tioga Counties. Of the three, Clearfield County received the smallest payout relative to
the size of the overall budget, while Tioga County received the largest. Greene County
fell in the mid-range. Public officials familiar with Act 13 and its implementation of the
impact fee were interviewed for the study. Officials were asked about various aspects of
the windfall (e.g. size, anticipation, etc.) as well as the political context in which the
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windfall payment decision-making process took place. In addition, archival materials
including meeting minutes, county documents, and local reports on the funds published in
local newspapers were reviewed as ancillary materials.
This study explores the hypothesis that the three counties would exhibit the
behaviors described by the behavioral economists. More specifically, this study attempted
to identify if a relationship between the size of the windfall and the propensity to
consume existed. Counties with small payouts relative to the overall budget were
expected to consume the windfall payment while counties with large payouts relative to
the size of the overall budget were expected to save. Success in the application of such
arguments may precipitate a shift toward behavioral economics and away from public
finance in the evaluation of windfall payment decision-making. Such a success would
build on the approach of Congdon et. al (2011) and others who emphasize the importance
of behavioral economics in public sector decision-making and public policy (Congdon,
Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011).
Results from the study of Clearfield, Greene, and Tioga Counties in fact
supported the assertions made by the behavioral economists. That is, the size of the
windfall was a determinant in the decision to spend or save the payment. Clearfield
County, which received the smallest payment relative to the 2013 Operating Budget,
intended to spend most of the windfall while Tioga County, which received the largest
payment relative to the 2013 Operating Budget, intended to save most of the payment.
Greene County, which received a medium-sized check in relation to Clearfield and Tioga
Counties, intended to spend most of the windfall payment. Interviews revealed that
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officials in Clearfield County largely perceived the payment to be a cash “bonus” with
limited investment opportunities and thus spent the payment. Greene County considered
the payment additional income and planned to use the payment to fund various projects.
Only Tioga County considered the payment an endowment for the future.
Determining how governing bodies behave in the face of a windfall payment has
important public policy implications, particularly in a jurisdiction with natural resource
extraction. With economic risk and various negative externalities associated with
resource extraction, the decision to spend or save revenue generated by Act 13 may have
a significant impact on the health and viability of a community in the future. For these
reasons, a normative argument in favor of saving all or part of the revenue in a legacy
fund (also known as a permanent fund) already exists. If perceptions of the revenue
preclude jurisdictions from saving, then policymakers may need to alter perceptions of
the windfall in order to better prepare for and/or mitigate future impacts of natural
resource extraction.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Before commencing the investigation of saving and expenditure patterns for
revenue generated by Act 13, an understanding of the extraction of non-renewable
resources, revenue capture, and windfall decision-making proves necessary. The
following review of the literature identifies the attractiveness of non-renewable natural
resource extraction as a means of generating wealth and revenue, describes the perils of
relying on extraction for economic prosperity, explains negative externalities associated
with extraction, and presents the two steams of thought relating to windfall decisionmaking processes.

Natural Resource Extraction in the Context of Economic “Boom” and “Bust”
Cycles
Traditionally, resource extraction has been extolled as an opportunity rather than a
liability for national, state, and local economies. Proponents of resource-based economic
growth argue that states with significant resource endowments are able to overcome
capital shortfalls as well as attract outside investment to initiate growth (Gunton, 2003;
Ross, 1999). As a consequence of such investment and an associated increase in
economic activity, individuals stand to gain from higher wages; firms stand to reap
profits; and governing bodies have the opportunity to collect additional revenues and
provide a higher level of public goods (Ross, 1999). Thus, resource extraction, on its
face, may appear to be an advantageous economic growth strategy for communities with
resource endowments. Given the potential for such benefits and the relative ease with
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which resources can be extracted, Ross (1999) contends that resource-based growth
represents a way for individuals, firms, and communities to ‘get rich quick’ (Ross, 1999).
The ‘get rich quick’ mentality manifests itself in the behaviors of firms,
individuals, and governments to capture the rewards from the extraction of resources.
That is, each player, in its own capacity, typically rushes to mine, drill, or otherwise
extract natural resources for economic gain (Adamson, 2008). The rapid pace and large
scale of resource extraction in communities led researchers to coin the term resource
“boom” (Haefele & Morton, 2009). After decades of the promotion of resource extraction
around the globe, however, a burgeoning body of literature suggests that sustained
growth resulting from resource extraction is rare (Auty, 1993). Where there is a resource
boom; there is an impending resource bust, which creates a cycle of economic highs and
lows (Smith, 1986).
Resource busts occur in many cases just as rapidly as the initial resource boom.
Factors which may lead to a bust include resource exhaustion, decreased demand for the
resource, excess supply, or a combination of these (Graves, Weiler, & Tynon, 2009). The
first factor, exhaustion, is the result of depletion of a particular resource (Gunton, 2003).
Resources like coal, natural gas, and oil are finite, and depleting a resource in the shortterm may preclude yields in the long-term. Additionally, if communities underestimate
the total supply of a resource, depletion may occur more quickly than anticipated, leading
to a resource bust. The second factor, decreases in demand, may lie beyond the control
of a nation, state, or community, but has a negative impact on extractive activities
nonetheless. In some instances, excess supply becomes a problem. Markets can be
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flooded or saturated, thus decreasing the value of the resource. Decreases in demand or
excess supply can turn extraction from a once profitable economic activity into an
unprofitable one and force a nation, state, or community to shift, perhaps unexpectedly,
toward other economic activities (Graves, Weiler, & Tynon, 2009).
The success of resource extraction, then, is highly dependent on the context in
which extraction occurs. A resource bust may be attributed to resource exhaustion and/or
unfavorable market conditions. After a bust, communities may choose to extract again
when conditions (such as prevailing price for a resource) improve. Thus an economic
boom and bust cycle emerges (Amundson, 1995). Historically, a number of resources
have exhibited such a pattern (Weber, 2012). From coal to yellowcake (uranium),
communities have boomed and busted across the United States and throughout the world
(Amundson, 1995). If resources are finite, and extraction is prone to (often rapid)
expansions and contractions, then a national, state, or community-wide dependence on
extraction for economic vitality invites risk.
Research shows that dependence on extraction as an economic driver may
negatively impact a community’s long-term economic prospects (Haefele & Morton,
2009). Generally, other economic activities beyond the scope of resource extraction in a
nation, state, or community experience stunted growth (James & Aadland, 2010;
Headwaters Economics, 2008; Stevens, 2003). The propensity for resource extraction and
resource dependence to translate into poor economic performance in other sectors in the
present and the community in the future has even led some economists to deem resource
extraction and associated profits a “curse” for national, state, and local economies (Auty,
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1993). Determining exactly how resource dependence affects overall economic growth
has spawned a vast body of literature, much of it with an international focus. In the
literature, numerous factors or what Stevens (2003) deems “transmission mechanisms”
emerge to explain the relationship between resource dependence and poor economic
performance (Stevens, 2003). The transmission mechanisms discussed by Stevens and
others include the ‘crowding out effect’ that resource extraction has on other industries,
the price volatility associated with commodities, the transient workforce extraction
typically attracts, localized inflation induced by extraction, and a tendency for
communities to overestimate needs for expansion (Stevens, 2003).
The first mechanism, the crowding out effect, refers to the tendency of resource
extraction to restrict economic diversity by ‘crowding out’ other industries. Researchers
concluded that extraction has a “resource movement effect” on the overall economy
(Corden & Neary, 1982; Headwaters Economics, 2011; Lemphers & Woynillowicz,
2012). The resource movement effect is defined as the tendency of extraction as the
dominant industry to pull capital (human and/or physical) away from other industries in
an economy (Corden & Neary, 1982). By pulling capital toward extraction, other
industries may not be able to compete in the economy and may consequently shut down
or avoid the market altogether. Such resource movement or re-allocation threatens an
economy’s overall economic diversity. Less economic diversity is associated with higher
rates of unemployment and less employment stability in a community (Haefele &
Morton, 2009). Moreover, when the resource bust occurs, communities are left with few
viable economic alternative activities as a result of crowding out. Only a handful of
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industries may exist to absorb the shock of the collapse of resource extraction (Haefele &
Morton, 2009).
The second transmission mechanism is the price volatility associated with
resource extraction. Prices for coal, oil, gas, and numerous other resources fluctuate in
international markets. Thus, when commodity prices rise and fall, so too do the wages of
workers and prices for goods and services at the site of extraction (Michaels, 2010). The
greater the dependence on resource extraction, the higher the variability of prices may be.
An entire economy, can hang in the balance of the prevailing price for a particular
commodity. When yellowcake (uranium) prices dramatically dropped in the American
West in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the local economies of extraction towns were
all but crushed (Amundson, 1995). Depending on a resource, which by its very nature
fluctuates in value, may put an entire economy on unsound footing.
A burgeoning extractive industry not only draws labor away from other industries
within an economy but also draws labor from elsewhere to the site of extraction (Graves,
Weiler, & Tynon, 2009). Many workers opt to move to the community for a short time
while others commute long distances on a daily basis (Adamson, 2008). The influx of
extraction-oriented workers creates the potential for significant economic leakages from
the local economy if workers stay only temporarily in the community or commute from
outside (Jacquet, 2011). Thus, the economic benefits of resource extraction may not
totally be reaped by those who live in the extraction community, as money ultimately
ends up in the pockets of those who live elsewhere. Worker transience thus fails to
bolster the resource extraction economy.
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Also problematic for economies driven by resource extraction is localized
inflation for long-time residents of extractive communities. As mentioned earlier,
fluctuating commodities prices are reflected in local economies; high prevailing prices
for coal, for example, may be reflected in higher wages and higher local prices for goods
and services (Michaels, 2010). Complementing inflation induced by commodities prices
is population growth in a community and subsequent increased demand for goods and
services (Lemphers & Woynillowicz, 2012; Michaels, 2010; Weber, 2012). As a result of
resource booms, communities thus face inflated prices. Most noteworthy in the literature
is the change in rents and home values as a result of resource extraction. With new labor
moving into the area, even if only temporarily, rents and home values typically skyrocket
(BBC Research and Consulting, 2008; Yamaguchi & Kuczek, 1984). Suddenly what may
have been an affordable place to live becomes unaffordable, particularly for those not
engaged in extraction (Yamaguchi & Kuczek, 1984).
Finally, the literature suggests that in response to increased demand for local
goods and services, communities often build up local amenities and infrastructure only to
over-shoot long-run supply (Gunton, 2003). The over-shoot can be attributed to the influx
of labor to communities with resource extraction. Because new citizens demand homes to
live in, roads to drive on, and entertainment to enjoy, communities increase the supply of
goods and services available (Adamson, 2008). With the resource bust, however, demand
drops back to pre-boom levels (or below), turning the expansion into excess (Amundson,
1995). Consequently, communities are left with a glut of houses, restaurants, and
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shopping malls—all of which typically have high, up-front, fixed costs that may not be
recovered post-bust (Gunton, 2003).
While resource extraction may appear to be advantageous for local, state, and
national economies, history shows otherwise. Turns toward natural resource extraction
often initiate economic boom and bust cycles for economies. In addition, research
suggests that a dependence on resource extraction may translate into poor, long-term
economic performance because of the crowding out of other industries, price volatility,
transient workforce, localized inflation, and infrastructural overshoots caused by
extraction-induced expansion.

Negative Externalities of Natural Resource Extraction
In addition to the issues discussed regarding economic boom and bust cycles and
long-term economic performance, natural resource extraction presents a number of
negative externalities for extractive communities. That is, resource extraction may cause
long-term economic problems as well as introduce additional negative externalities.
Some of the externalities associated with extraction include: damage to community
infrastructure, increased traffic and noise, a higher crime rate, and environmental
degradation. As communities engage in resource extraction, one or any combination of
these negative externalities may appear.
As previously mentioned, resource extraction may lead to over-shoots in
infrastructural expansion. Communities expand under the assumption that economic
growth through extraction will be sustained and expansions will be paid-off in the future.
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Research shows that in addition to the new shopping malls, restaurants, and various other
amenities that communities build for the growth spurred by extraction, significant
damage is done to the assets the community already has (Christopherson & Rightor,
2011). Thus, extraction strains community resources as well as damages community
infrastructure.
The tendency for resource extraction to strain community resources and cause
infrastructural damage may be attributed to the capital intensive nature of resource
extraction. Exploitation of a resource typically requires a sizable workforce (human
capital) as well as heavy machinery (physical capital) (Wood & Ward, 2009). The
intensity of extraction in terms of human capital contributes to strains in community
services, as extraction attracts workers from outside of the community with higher wages,
as discussed earlier (Graves, Weiler, & Tynon, 2009). With the influx of workers,
demand for goods and services increases, straining community resources, including social
services (Lockie, Franettovich, Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009). Crime may
rise, schools may become overcrowded, and medical services may prove inadequate. In
response, communities must increase supply of these services to accommodate the influx
of workers associated with resource extraction (Kassover & McKeown, 1981).
Similarly, because of the intensity of extraction in terms of physical capital,
communities often face extensive damage to local infrastructure (Christopherson &
Rightor, 2011). Governments in communities across the United States complain that
increased traffic due to population growth as well as growth in commerce and
construction associated with extraction put a strain on roads and bridges (Kassover &
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McKeown, 1981). With hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania and Ohio for example, local
governments are concerned that roads may not be able to sustain the loads of trucks
traveling back and forth across communities to construct natural gas wellheads (Wood &
Ward, 2009). Some of the drilling equipment involved in natural gas development weighs
more than 100 tons, well above the carrying capacity of local roads and bridges (Wood &
Ward, 2009). With overloaded trucks traveling to well sites numerous times a day,
infrastructural damage is inevitable. Such concerns are not uncommon; infrastructural
damage and concerns about the provision of services exist throughout extraction
communities for a range of resources, from coal to uranium (Lockie, Franettovich,
Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009; Amundson, 1995).
In addition, resource extraction presents numerous negative environmental
externalities. Some of these externalities include air pollution, soil erosion, and
contamination of surface and groundwater (New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, 1992). Coal extraction serves as an example of each of
these types of environmental degradation. Mining has been linked to air pollution in
many extraction communities as dust from mines, stock piles, and carrying cars fill the
air. Air quality in some cases may be so poor that residents in mining towns attribute
chronic respiratory illnesses, such as asthma, to the mines (Lockie, Franettovich,
Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009). Furthermore, the mining process is a major
cause of soil erosion and disruption of overland flows. With a disruption to overland
flows, runoff increases, and water bodies become polluted (Lockie, Franettovich,
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Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009). Such degradation is not limited to coal
mining but also associated with most extractive activities.
Valuation techniques for environmental costs are imprecise if not unreliable and
often underestimate total environmental damage (Matthews & Lave, 2000). Complicating
matters is the fact that at times, environmental damage is less visible and/or does not
appear until years or even decades after extraction commences. Lower visibility of
environmental damage may cause extraction communities to further underestimate total
environmental costs. Underestimation may be occurring in Pennsylvania where hydraulic
fracturing for natural gas takes place thousands of feet underground. Consequently, a
flurry of debate in Pennsylvania regarding true environmental damage and its cost exists
in the state.
With the potential for significant economic growth also comes the potential for
significant infrastructural and environmental costs. Resource extraction may present an
opportunity to ‘get rich quick’, but the long-term costs, as discussed here, in addition to
the potential for poor overall economic performance in the long-run detract from the
attractiveness of resource extraction as a spur for economic growth. The next section
describes how communities capitalize on extraction to address these concerns.

Extraction and Taxation
Given the tenuous relationship between resource extraction and economic growth
as well as the significant infrastructural and environmental costs imposed by extraction,
maximization of the benefits of resource extraction becomes particularly important in
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policy discussions (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011; Dixon, 2011). If resource
extraction can be linked to poor economic performance, then some measure or set of
measures are typically put in place to capture a portion of the economic gains in the
present and use it to offset the inevitable bust. In addition, measures must be in place to
address any additional burdens of resource extraction, such as infrastructural and
environmental degradation (Widerquist & Howard, 2012). In the United States, the
measure or set of measures typically adopted by policymakers to capitalize on extraction
and address the burdens of extraction is taxation (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011;
Dixon, 2011).
Many states that tax natural resource extraction have established a severance tax.
The term “severance” refers to the fact that a resource is ‘severed’ from land or water.
While severance taxes are levied on a variety of natural resources—including but not
limited to coal, fish, natural gas, oil, and timber—energy producing states, particularly
those with oil and gas endowments, receive the majority of total severance tax revenues
(Richardson, 1999). Severance taxes are calculated in a variety of ways, depending on the
state and the resource. Typically, coal, natural gas, and oil have a tax levied based on the
volume of the resource extracted or as a percentage of market value (Richardson, 1999;
National Conference of State Legislatures). The table below displays a number of tax
schemes for natural gas in five states.
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Table 2- Natural Gas Tax Schemes (Patton,, 2012)

State

Method of Collection

Severance Tax Rate

Colorado

Percentage of market
value

Louisiana

Cents-per-thousand
cubic feet
Percentage of market
value
Cents-per-thousand
cubic feet
Percentage of market
value

2% of income up to $25K;
3% $25K - $100k; 4%
$100K - $300k; 5% over
$300k
16.4 cents per MCF

New Mexico
North Dakota
West Virginia

3.75%
4 cents per MCF
5.0%

As shown in the table, Louisiana and North Dakota levy a severance tax on
natural gas based on volume at rates as high as 16.4 cents and as low as 4 cents per
million cubic feet (mcf), respectively. Others, like New Mexico and Colorado, tax based
on a percentage of market value as high as 7.5 percent and as low as 2 percent,
respectively (Patton, 2012). The structure of severance taxes is quite diverse, even in just
these five states. Greater diversity exists between resources, with states adopting one or
multiple methods of taxation for one or multiple resources.
The severance tax is an attractive option for policymakers in extractive
communities. Perhaps most attractive is the fact that severance taxes are conducive to tax
exportation—that is, passing a portion of the overall tax burden in a state along to
consumers of a particular resource outside of the state (Patton, 2011). In other words,
severance taxes are not necessarily paid by the firms and citizens engaged in extraction
but shifted to consumers of the resource (outside) of the community. Because of the
potential for tax exportation, severance taxes often prove more politically feasible than
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other taxes, such as the property tax, which is collected from state residents only (Shelton
& Morgan, 1977).
While the severance tax is popular among resource extraction states, other means
of collecting revenue are used in conjunction with or in lieu of the severance. Some of the
most common alternative methods of collection include the imposition of real property
tax, personal property tax, and/or corporate income tax (Kent & Eastham, 2011). Like the
severance tax, however, the levies on extraction vary by resource and state, creating a
diverse landscape of tax structures throughout the United States.
The first of these alternative methods, the real property tax, is a tax levied on a
resource based on ownership. The tax may combine or separate the value of a resource
with the value of surface land. In other words, landowners may pay a property tax based
on the value of a resource in addition to a tax on the value of surface land or landowners
may pay one property tax which combines both values (Kent & Eastham, 2011).
Furthermore, the rate of taxation (combined or separate) may be contingent on the state
of production. That is, if extraction is or is not actively taking place (Kent & Eastham,
2011).
The second alternative method is the personal property tax. The personal property
tax in relation to resource extraction is levied on the machinery or equipment involved in
the extraction process. West Virginia, for example, uses three methods to measure the
value of equipment involved in coal production, averages the values, and then assesses a
tax on 60 percent of the average (Kent & Eastham, 2011). Such a tax, however, is highly
dependent on the assessed value of such equipment. The third alternative method is the
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corporate income tax or commercial activity tax which is levied at a simple rate on
corporations involved in the production and sale of the resources extracted (Kent &
Eastham, 2011).
While taxes are a useful way to address negative externalities and capitalize on a
resource that is finite, the generation of revenue from taxes is contingent upon the
production of the resource. Therefore, when resource yields decline either due to
decreases in supply or demand, so too does the revenue generated from extraction. For
this very reason, taxation is an imperfect tool for policymakers (Dixon, 2011). And while
other policy tools including restrictions and quotas on production exist, a discussion of
taxation and other similar schemes, such as the severance tax/impact fee hybrid
established by Pennsylvania (discussed later on), proves most applicable in the United
States (Widerquist & Howard, 2012). Having established the ways in which communities
capitalize on extraction through taxation, the remaining sections address the expenditures
of these revenues by governing bodies.

Natural Resource Revenue as a ‘Windfall’
The fields of public policy and public finance suggest that revenue generated by
natural resources are a financial windfall for states, counties, and municipalities engaged
in natural resource extraction (Widerquist & Howard, 2012). Widerquist and Howard
(2012) explain that revenues from natural resources are a windfall in the sense that they
are difficult to forecast—as a result of factors such as commodity price volatility—and in
the sense that they are temporary—there is almost always an impending resource bust. It
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is thus the uncertainty associated with these funds that causes many to consider them a
‘windfall’ rather than a dependable source of revenue (Wilson & Sylvia, 1993). These
windfalls may be saved or spent. If spend, the funds may be used to address the
externalities or costs associated with extraction, or for a host of other uses.
With an understanding that revenues from resource extraction are a windfall for
governing bodies, a review of the literature concerning windfall revenue spending and
saving is necessary. Saving and expenditure patterns for natural resource revenues have
been well documented, though mostly for countries other than the United States.
Specifically, much of the literature on the topic focuses on the policy decisions of
governing bodies in the Developing World. A number of these studies conclude that
expenditure of windfalls in their entirety are quite common and are often associated with
vast expansions in the public sector (Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier, 2006; Talvi & Vegh,
2005). In contrast, few works have examined natural resource revenue windfall
expenditures in the United States (Wilson & Sylvia, 1993).
Windfall policy examinations in the United States more often deal with topics
such as state lotteries, unexpected increases in general tax revenue and more recently,
tobacco master settlement agreements (Sloan, Carlisle, Rattliff, & Trogdon, 2005; Miller
& Pierce, 1997; Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). All of these policy exmainations
fall within a stream of literature borrowed largely from the field of public budgeting. This
stream emphasizes various agents or actors in the decision-making process as well as the
political, economic, and social circumstances surrounding the process. A very different
stream, adapted from the field of behavioral economics, emphasizes the size of windfall
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payments as a key determinant of the propensity to spend such payments. The next two
sections describe each of these streams of literature and their implications for windfall
decision-making.

Insights from Public Budgeting: The Context of Windfall Decision-Making
Much of the literature exploring windfall payments suggests that the decisionmaking process regarding whether to save or spend a windfall does not significantly
differ from the decision-making process associated with non-windfall revenue. Despite
disagreement in the field of public budgeting regarding incremental budget changes and
the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PEM)2, policy examinations with specific reference
to windfall payments suggests that the decision-making process is highly influenced by
various agents or actors and external factors, such a fiscal stress or social unrest.
The ‘politics’-based approach to public budgeting was advanced by Levine et. al
(1981) in a study of municipalities under fiscal stress during the 1970s. In that study, the
researchers concluded that lobbyists, interest groups, and public officials as well as
economic and political circumstances influenced budget decision-making (Levine, Rubin,

2

The field of public budgeting, particularly in recent years, has been dominated by the two
broader theories of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). The theory
of incrementalism posits that changes from year to year in public budgets are small, due in part to tradition
and in part to the complexity of the decision-making process (Holcombe, 2006). A slight departure from
incrementalism, the theory of the punctuated equilibrium (also known as the punctuated equilibrium model
or PEM), contends that annual changes to a budget are small or incremental in the majority of cases;
however, occasional, radical shifts or punctuations occur from time to time (Arnett, 2012). A windfall
payment may represent punctuation or a departure from the budgeting norm. These theories do not shed
much light on the present question, since they attempt to explain changes in level rather than type of
expenditure. Indeed, Levine et. al (1981) contend that even during punctuations the budgeting process
remains the same.
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& Wolohojian, 1981). Studies concerning tobacco master settlement agreements in the
1990s and 2000s made similar conclusions (Sloan, Carlisle, Rattliff, & Trogdon, 2005).
Research examining expenditure patterns for the settlement payments, specifically
concludes that decisions are highly influenced by lobbyists, interest groups, and state
fiscal health. Several other works echo the claims of Levine et. al (1981) and Sloan et. al
(2005) including Garrick et. al (2009), Jordan (2003) and Cutler et. al. (1993) (Garrick,
Johnson, & Neiman, 2009; Jordan 2003; Cutler, Elmendorf, & Zeckhauser, 1993).
A set of studies similar to those above draws more specific conclusions about
which public officials, lobbying groups, and citizens have the potential to significantly
influence how windfall revenue is spent. These same studies shed light on the importance
of the context in which the decision is made, such as the economic and/or political
climate surrounding the process. The following sections identify and describe the actors
and factors which prove most pertinent as identified by the literature.

Actors Involved in the Budget-Making Process
The politics-based approach advanced by Levine et. al (1981) and more recently
Sloan et. al (2005) identify citizens (or voters), elected officials, and interest
groups/lobbyists as the most influential actors in the budget-making process (Levine,
Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981; Sloan, Carlisle, Rattliff, & Trogdon, 2005). Depending on
the level of engagement of each of these actors, policy outcomes and budgetary decisions
vary. Consequently, the decision to save or spend a windfall depends not only on who is
involved in the process but also how each actor is involved.
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The first of these actors, the citizen within the community, may have the
opportunity to participate in the budget decision-making process. Whether through
council meetings, public hearings, special sessions, or elections, citizens articulate their
preferences for budgetary decisions. Budgetary preferences are at least partially based on
the self-interest and knowledge-base of each individual citizen (Mantzavinos, 2004).
Therefore, citizens engaged in the decision-making process are prone to advocating for
program funding which benefit themselves. Conversely, citizens may argue against
programs which benefit them least. The relationship between the self-interested behaviors
of citizens and budgetary preferences has been documented. In a study of elderly
residents in a community, for example, Cutler et. al (1993) found that the elderly were
less likely to support spending on schools than other segments of the population because
they were least likely to benefit from the services schools provide (Cutler, Elmendorf, &
Zeckhauser, 1993). In a situation in which unallocated funds appear, such as with a
revenue windfall, various actors within the community come forward to request the funds
for preferred programs and policies (Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). Thus, an
understanding of which individuals or blocs of voters engage in the budget decisionmaking process may elucidate the preference to save or consume the windfall payment.
Also important are the elected officials in a jurisdiction who act as agents for
voters both engaged and disengaged from the budget-decision making process. While
Sloan et. al. acknowledge that elected officials may exercise considerable latitude in
budgetary judgments, future electability is deemed an important factor in weighing
decisions (Sloan, Carlisle, Rattliff, & Trogdon, 2005). In their study of public budgeting,
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Wilson and Sylvia (1993) argue that the budget decision-making process is a tool
employed by politicians to reinforce a politician’s own base of power and/or to serve the
needs of a politician’s own constituents (Wilson & Sylvia, 1993). Budget decisions, then,
are at least partially a function of political self-preservation. Even when not explicitly
politically driven, budget decisions tend to favor the individuals or groups closest to
politicians (Kyu-Nahm, 2012). This tendency for budgets to benefit those closest to a
public official is referred to by Kyu-Nahm (2012) as the ‘parochial’ tendency of budget
decision-making (Kyu-Nahm, 2012). Examining the behaviors of politicians involved in
the process and identifying the interests they represent may help to explain if natural
resource windfalls are spent or saved. Politicians may find a windfall to be an excellent
opportunity to reinforce their base of power.
Finally, Sloan et. al argue that lobbyists and interest groups play a significant role
in budget decision-making (Sloan, Carlisle, Rattliff, & Trogdon, 2005).The role of the
interest group may be defined as either electoral or influential. The electoral role is
characterized by public support of a candidate or a position (typically financial in nature).
The influential role is characterized by education or dissemination of information
regarding a candidate or position. Thus, in the realm of budgetary choices, a lobbying
group may use resources to financially support a politician or budget initiative or merely
use resources to inform the public about the decision at hand. Identifying the interest
groups and lobbyists that emerge in the procsss may help to explain jurisdicitions’
decision to save or spend the revenue.
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As stated earlier, in considering the influence of actors in the decision-making
process one must not only examine which actors are involved but also how actors are
involved. The previous discussion of lobbyists provides a very specific description of the
ways in which these groups become engaged. Jordan (2003) more broadly defines such
behaviors, whether adopted by lobbyists, individuals or elected officials as political
mobilization (Jordan, 2003). Political mobilization may be defined as the process by
which actors reach out to the public or are reached out to by a particular group (Jordan,
2003). Jordan (2003) posits that individuals, elected officials, and lobbyists aligned with
certain interests are typically more successful in political mobilization than others
(Jordan, 2003). Actors associated with services such as police, fire, and sanitation are
most likely to be successful whereas the actors associated with services such as parks,
recreation, and highways are least likely to be successful (Jordan, 2003). Those groups or
individuals who evoke a public outcry on their behalf are most likely to mobilize public
support in the budgeting process and in turn secure funding. By highlighting the threat of
crime, an inability to fight fires, and overflowing garbage, for example, actors associated
with police, fire, and sanitation create enough of a public outcry to influence budgetary
decisions. Political mobilization by various groups or individuals could induce spending
of the windfall on additional or supplemental public goods.
Citizens, politicians, and lobbyists use political mobilization to influence
budgetary decisions. In order to understand how jurisdictions behave when given a
windfall payment, analysis of these various actors and political mobilization is necessary.
Thus, determining how or if citizens or lobbyists were involved in the decision-making
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process could provide valuable insights. Only by coupling an understanding of who was
involved in the process with an evaluation of the atmosphere or context in which the
decisions are made can behaviors be ascertained.

The Context of Budget-Making
Equally important as the actors in the decision-making process is the context in
which decisions are made. In the literature concerning public budgets and more
specifically windfall payment spending, intergovernmental funds and fiscal stress as well
as social/political discontent are critical in defining the context in which budgets are
made. In addition, environmental literature proposes that the perception of long-term
sustainability and a concern for the environment in a community may significantly
influence a jurisdiction’s decision to spend or save the funds. The following is a
discussion of each of these contextual influences.
In terms of the context of budget decision-making, Levine et. al (1981), Hite and
Ulbrich (1986), and Jordan (2003) argue that actions taken by upper-level governmental
bodies may have a significant influence on budgetary decisions for state and local
governments. In other words, budget changes made by one branch or level of government
may precipitate a change in other parts (Jordan, 2003). In many cases such a relationship
exists because of the shared burden of revenue collection and provision of services
between various levels of government (Hite & Ulbrich, 1986). To be more specific,
because local, state, and national governments share revenues from various taxes and
share the costs of various services, if one level of government stops payment on a
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particular service or cuts a particular tax, that stop payment or tax cut may force another
level of government to pick up the budgetary slack. If the windfall payment is received in
an atmosphere of inter-governmental budget cuts, the likelihood that the windfall
payment is spent to mitigate those cuts is significant.
Changes in spending by various levels of government may put a strain on the
financial resources of a jurisdiction. That is, the actions of other governmental bodies
may cause a community to experience fiscal stress, a component which Arnett (2012)
argues is paramount in the discussion of the context of budget decision-making (Arnett,
2012). For the budget outcomes in communities in times of fiscal calamity may differ
greatly from those in times of fiscal soundness. Before identifying the relationship
between fiscal stress and expenditure patterns, however, one must first determine an
appropriate definition of ‘fiscal stress’. Arnett (2012) provides a survey of the literature
on this topic and concludes that no common definition of the term exists, though in its
broadest form, fiscal stress may be defined as a “case of expenditures exceeding available
financial resources” (Arnett, 2012, p 60). For a more precise definition, however, Arnett
(2012), cites Kloha et al. (2005) and comments that fiscal stress may be representative of
a “a failure to meet standards in areas of operating position, debt, and community needs
and resources over successive years” (Arnett, 2012, p 60). In short, communities
experience fiscal stress when they have too many bills and too few resources to pay them.
In response to fiscal stress, states typically attempt to reduce spending, increase
revenue, implement efficiency gains (provide the same services for less money), or
transfer funds between accounts (tap into rainy day funds) (Arnett, 2012). The array of

29

these responses is typically referred to as ‘fiscal retrenchment’ (Levine, Rubin, &
Wolohojian, 1981). Fiscal retrenchment may be generally characterized as a process
which moves from revenue enhancements, to efficiency increases, to service reductions
(Pammer, 1990). That is, jurisdictions typically attempt to raise new revenue and if that
fails, jurisdictions move toward making services more efficient before resorting to
service cuts. Past studies reveal a clear preference of jurisdictions to increase efficiency
rather than reducing service levels (Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). However, since
2001 a shift toward the cutback management paradigm, which includes across-the-board
and targeted cuts, has emerged (Arnett, 2012).
Fiscal stress may create an atmosophere of uncertainty and/or prudence during
budget negotiations. Thus, fiscal stress, either real or perceived, becomes an important
factor in defining the context in which windfall payment decisions are made. If upperlevel budget cuts are made or an economic contraction occurs, then a community with a
resource revenue windfall may choose to use the windfall to compensate for the budget
cut or economic contraction. Thus, windfalls present jurisdictions with the additional
funds needed to weather the storm of fiscal stress.
Jurisdictions do not always experience fiscal stress, however. In fact,
communities may experience periods of expansion. During times of such expansion,
jurisdictions may offer a host of new or additional services and/or benefits for citizens
(Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). Levine et. al (1981) cites New York City as a
prime example. A period of rapid economic growth in New York City translated into a
number of revenue windfalls in the 1960s . Such windfalls led to a significant expansion
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of services offered in hospitals and higher education as well as a significant increases in
the salaries and benefits offered to public employees (Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian,
1981). During this time, such expansions were made with short-term solvency in mind
(which helps to explain the impending fiscal stress post-expansion) (Levine, Rubin, &
Wolohojian, 1981). Short-term versus long-term prospects aside, a community on
economically sound footing may interpret a resource revenue windfall as an opportunity
to expand servcies and benefits. Therefore, a windfall payment may be spent rather than
saved in order to augment funds and establish new or additional programs.
In addition to governmental interactions and fiscal health, a discussion of the
context of budget-decision making for resource revenue windfalls requires an analysis of
the social dynamics in a jurisdiction. Levine et. al (1981) mentions the propensity for
social dynamics or movements to effect budget decisions. In the analysis of New York
City, for example, Levine et al. acknowledge that social unrest at least partially affected
budget decisions during the 1960s (Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). A survey of the
body of social research on resource extraction communities suggests that social change in
resource extraction communities is great (Adamson, 2008). One might expect for such
changes to frame, at least in part, the decision-making process.
Survey research conducted in resource extraction communities identifies a
number of physical and social changes which develop as a result of resource extraction.
Most of these changes elicit a negative response from community members. Some of
these problematic changes include: increased demand for public services, increased
perception of social isolation, increased levels of crime, and stresses on infrastructure, as
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discussed earlier (Lockie, Franettovich, Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009;
Brown, Dorius, & Krannich, 2005 Lewis, 1993). Many of these changes have come to
the forefront of social debate in resource extraction communities and have created an
atmosphere of unrest (Brown, Dorius, & Krannich, 2005). If social or political discontent
exists, apart from political mobilization already discussed, a jurisdiction may choose to
spend the funds rather than save them to address these issues.
Finally, one must have an understanding of the environmental context in which
budget decisions are made. For budget decisions may be heavily influenced if not
dictated by a jurisdiction’s concern for the environmental changes induced by extraction.
Similarly, the decision to spend the funds may be dictated by the prevailing concern or
lack thereof for environmental costs. Much of the literature on this topic comes from
outside of public budgeting but proves germane nonetheless.
As discussed earlier, widespread concern regarding the environmental changes
induced by extraction has been documented in the social research on extraction
communities (Lockie, Franettovich, Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009).
Residents in extraction communities often link extractive activity to air and water quality
issues once extraction has commenced (Lockie, Franettovich, Petkova-Timmer, Rolfe, &
Ivanova, 2009). While community surveys in extraction communities have not
specifically addressed citizen mobilization to address environmental concerns, a body of
environmental literature suggests that in cases in which the visibility of sources of
pollution (e.g. mills, mines, rigs, etc.) as well as signs of environmental degradation (e.g.
polluted water, foul smells, etc.) is high, mobilization to address environmental concerns
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is common (Gould, 1993). Important to note, however, is that signs of environmental
degradation are not always immediate (Matthews & Lave, 2000). Years may pass before
damage becomes apparent (Vianna & Polan, 1984). Therefore, mobilization may be
significantly delayed. Drawing from the environmental literature, one might expect that
in extraction communities, where pollution is often conspicuous, citizens will mobilize
and demand public action to address environmental concerns. Such public action may be
reflected in the budget of the jurisdiction and/or the use of windfalls derived from
resource extraction.
A community’s awareness of environmental cost also helps to define the context
in which budgeting decisions are made. That is, the extent to which residents are aware of
environmental costs and ways in which communities estimate environmental damage
influences budget decision-making. For a community familiar with or understanding of
the costs of clean-up from extraction (or other natural disasters) may be more willing to
save part or all of the revenue to mitigate such impacts. Literature on economic loss and
the environment suggests that communities, states, and nations are often unaware or have
difficulty assessing the costs of environmental damage (Committee on Assessing the
Costs of Natural Disaster, 1999). Frequently, communities underestimate costs of
disasters, such as earthquakes and oil spills, and estimates skyrocket over time (Petak &
Elahi, 2001). Furthermore, communities often fail to appreciate the indirect costs of
environmental damage (Kreiser, Sirisom, Ashiabor, & Milne, 2011). In an oil spill, for
example, citizens anticipate a loss for fishermen, but often underestimate the loss for
beachfront property owners, tourism, and recreation (Goldberg, 1994). Identifying the
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level of concern for environmental cost thus becomes important in defining the context of
the windfall payment decision-making process.
In sum, resource revenue windfalls represent an opportunity for jurisdictions to
depart from the incrementalism typically associated with the budget-making process.
Actors or agents in a jurisdiction may coalesce or politically mobilize to deter saving,
induce spending, and capture a portion of the windfall. Simultaneously, various other
factors, namely intergovernmental budget cuts, fiscal stress, social unrest, and
environmental consciousness may also dictate whether a jurisdiction saves or spends the
windfall payment. By applying the approach outlined in this stream of literature
pertaining to windfall payments, one may be able to anticipate the behaviors of
jurisdictions in Pennsylvania facing a windfall payment from Act 13.

Insights from Behavioral Economics: Windfall Size and the Propensity to Consume
A second stream of literature specifically focused on windfall gains predates the
work of Levine et. al (1981) and other researchers in the field of public budgeting. Early
works from this alternate stream first examined the simple decision of individuals to
spend or save windfall payments. The results from these early works indicated that
individuals were no more likely to spend windfall payments than income (Reid, 1962).
Research conducted since has had mixed results, with some researchers finding a
noticeable correlation between windfall payments and consumption. Some studies
suggest windfall payments are consumed greater in proportion to income, and others find
a spurious relationship (Bodkin, 1959; Kreinin, 1961).
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In 1985, Keeler et. al (1985), building on the work of Landsberger (1966),
attempted to reconcile the inconsistencies in the literature by suggesting that windfalls are
often consumed in proportion to the size of the windfall to an individual or household’s
total income (Keeler, James, & Abdel-Ghany, 1985; Landsberger, 1966). In other words,
individuals are generally more likely to spend windfalls that are small in proportion to
income and save those that are large in proportion to income. Keeler et. al (1985) reason
that transaction costs involved in saving a small windfall (e.g. brokerage fees, credit
arrangements, etc.) discourage saving and encourage spending (Keeler, James, & AbdelGhany, 1985). Transaction costs per dollar decrease with larger windfalls and thus
individuals are more inclined to save. Specifically, Keeler et. al suggest a series of
thresholds for saving and spending the windfall payment (Keeler, James, & AbdelGhany, 1985). When a windfall payment is below 20 percent of total income, saving does
not typically occur. Between 20 and 40 percent, windfalls are saved or spent as if they
were normal income. Above 40 percent, noticeable saving becomes apparent (Keeler,
James, & Abdel-Ghany, 1985).
The works of Thaler (1985), Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Milkman et. al (2007)
offer an alternative explanation as to why individuals are inclined to spend smaller
windfall payments. According to the “mental accounting” model advanced by Thaler
(1985), Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Milkman et. al (2007), individuals establish
various “mental accounts” designated for spending or saving. Under this model,
individuals typically place small, one-time windfall gains in a “mad money” account to
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spend frivolously (Clark, 2002). Conversely, large income gains are placed in more
stringently regulated mental accounts.
The stringency or laxness with which mental accounts are regulated is a result of
the prevalence of non-fungibility in the mental accounting system. Congdon et. al (2011)
explain that in the mental accounting system, individuals fail to treat income equally
across all accounts (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011). Thus, individuals may
value earned money, from a paycheck for example, more than found or extra money,
such as that from a windfall. In an experiment conducted by Arkes et. al (1994),
researchers found that participants who received a small windfall of $3-5 used the funds
as ‘other money’ while gambling rather than spending their own funds (Arkes, Joyner,
Pezzo, Nash, Siegel-Jacobs, & Stone, 1994). Lesser valued funds or funds that are
seemingly easier to part with form mental “mad money” accounts. Windfall payments,
which may be perceived as unearned, are therefore deposited into such accounts where
they are more often spent than saved (Clark, 2002).
It is important to note that the frequency of windfalls is relevant to the decision to
spend or save. Keeler et. al (1985) qualify their results by stating that savings become
apparent in the face of repeated gains. Thus, the inclination to spend a small windfall may
disappear when a payment is received multiple times (Keeler, James, & Abdel-Ghany,
1985). Other researchers have similarly qualified the findings of Keeler et. al (1985) by
emphasizing the importance of anticipation in the decisions of individuals to save or
spend windfall payments. In other words, individuals who become aware of a windfall
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and have substantial time to contemplate uses are less likely to spend the funds outright
(Arkes, Joyner, Pezzo, Nash, Siegel-Jacobs, & Stone, 1994).
The qualifications made regarding repetition and expectations present a potential
flaw in the application of this stream of literature to windfall payments for natural
resources. Jurisdictions in fact typically receive payments over multiple years and are
aware that payments will come. However, as mentioned earlier, a great deal of
uncertainty still remains tied to natural resource windfall payments (Widerquist &
Howard, 2012). The number of times a payment will be repeated is unclear as the
sustainability of extraction is questionable. The size of the payment is also uncertain, as
commodities fluctuate a great deal on the market in terms of supply, demand, and price.
Thus, although jurisdictions anticipate a windfall, estimations of the size of the windfall
still remain imprecise. Anecdotal evidence from Pennsylvania supports this notion as
estimations of the size of the windfall payments fluctuated over a period of several
months for many municipalities. Despite the fact that the law was passed in February
2012, estimations of payouts were still to be negotiated as recently as January 2013.
Also important to note is the fact that this stream of research on windfalls largely
ignores external factors in the decision-making process. That is, many other factors which
may influence an individual’s decision are controlled for. For example, socio-economic
status, age, and/or employment play little if any role in the discussion of the propensity to
save or spend for individuals. Only the size, frequency, and anticipation of the windfall
prove pertinent. If extended to a jurisdiction rather than just an individual or household,
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many of the factors and actors identified by the other stream of literature are not taken
into account by the behavioral economics stream.
More to this end, this stream of research has been limited predominantly to
individuals or households and has not been applied to public finance. Talvi and Vegh
(2005) reviewed a number of studies which have reached beyond the scope of the
individual and the household, though much of the research has been international in
scope with a focus on developing economies (Talvi & Vegh, 2005). Works reviewed by
Talvi and Vegh (2005) equate individual or household income to the size of a nation’s
budget. The works generally indicate a high propensity to consume windfall revenues
regardless of the proportional size of the revenue to the overall budget (Talvi & Vegh,
2005).
As a largely simplified approach to windfall budget decision-making, this stream
of literature focuses exclusively on the size of a windfall payment as a key determinant in
the propensity to spend or consume a windfall. Extended to public budgets, rather than
examining the ‘actors’ and ‘factors’ in the budgeting process, this stream of literature
proposes a focus on the size of the revenue in proportion to a jurisdiction’s overall budget
for insights. A jurisdiction with a large windfall which represents a sizable proportion of
the overall budget may save more than a jurisdiction with a small windfall which
represents a small proportion of the overall budget.
This study attempted to test the assertions of this second stream of literature by
examining three counties in Pennsylvania that received windfall payments from natural
gas revenue. The windfall size in proportion to overall budget varied between the three
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counties to observe differences in behavior as expected by the behavioral economic
approach described here. Successful application of this stream to the public arena may
precipitate a turn away from the public budgeting toward behavioral economics. Before
completing this analysis, however, a description of the law, Act 13, which established the
impact fee, is necessary.

Act 13 and Natural Gas in Pennsylvania
The rapidity with which Pennsylvania has pursued natural gas extraction is
characteristic of the “boom” discussed earlier in the review of the literature. Because of
this similarity, the relative infancy of the industry, and the passage of a recent bill
establishing a fee on natural gas extraction, Pennsylvania proves to be an excellent case
to examine the decision-making process for resource revenue windfalls. Before
addressing jurisdictions’ decisions to save or spend the windfall, however, a discussion of
natural gas and the structure of Act 13, the legislation which established the fee on
natural gas extraction in Pennsylvania, proves necessary.
Pennsylvania’s endowment of natural gas is a part of the Marcellus Shale
Formation, a sedimentary rock formation which lies beneath eastern Ohio, northern West
Virginia, western Maryland, western and northeastern Pennsylvania, and southern New
York (Andrews, et al., 2009). The formation contains an estimated 12 trillion cubic feet
(tcf) of natural gas, with most of the recoverable gas found in Pennsylvania (Andrews, et
al., 2009). Production of natural gas in Pennsylvania from unconventional wells began in
earnest in 2008 with approximately 200 wells in operation by year end (Andrews, et al.,
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2009). Since then—drilling has grown exponentially, with nearly 9,000 unconventional
natural gas wells in operation in 2012 (State Impact, 2012).
In February 2012, the state legislature of Pennsylvania passed Act 13, a law
which represented a complete overhaul of natural gas policy in the state (State Impact,
2012) . Most notably, the legislation established permitting regulations for natural gas
wells, addressed zoning and land use concerns relating to natural gas extraction, and
provided for an unconventional gas fee (Act 13, 2012). Since its passage, the legislation
has met contention. Arguably, the most controversial components of the law are the
zoning and land use measures. Opponents of the measures argue that the legislation limits
the power of local governments to regulate the siting of wells and ignores local land use
decision-making processes (State Impact, 2012). Strong opposition to the measures
consequently resulted in a challenge to the legislation in the State Supreme Court.
For the purposes of discussing windfall payment decision-making, the impact fee
provision proves most pertinent. Per Act 13, each well drilled in the state is subject to a
fee for a maximum of 15 years. The fee follows a graduated or bracket system with the
bracket of each well determined by the annual prevailing price of natural gas per cubic
foot adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (see Table 2 below). If, for example, the
annual average prevailing price of gas is $2.25 or less (the lowest bracket) per cubic in
the first year of production for the well, the fee collected is $40,000. If the average annual
price of gas remains $2.25 or less, the fee is reduced in the second year to $30,000. When
the average annual price of gas increases, however, wells move to a higher bracket and
the fee increases. Consequently, revenue generation per well is dependent on both the
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age of the well and the annual prevailing price of natural gas. Such a system introduces
the potential for significant revenue variability.

Table 3- Impact Fee Structure of Act 13 (County Commissioner's Association of Pennsylvania, 2012)

Year of
Production
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Years 4-10
Years 11-15

Average Gas Price
< $2.25
$40,000
$30,000
$25,000
$10,000

$2.25 - $2.99
$45,000
$35,000
$30,000
$15,000
$5,000

$3.00 - $4.99
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000

$5.00 - $5.99
$55,000
$45,000
$40,000
$20,000
$10,000

> $5.99
$60,000
$55,000
$50,000

The fee is administered and collected at the state level by the Public Utility
Commission (PUC). Once the fee is collected, monies are aggregated in the
Unconventional Gas Well Fund which is administered by the PUC. After collection, a
portion of the funds are allocated to county conservation districts, the Pennsylvania Fish
and Boat Commission, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the State Fire
Commissioner, the Department of Transportation, the PUC, and the Marcellus Legacy
Fund (Act 13, 2012). The Marcellus Legacy Fund, as established by the law, may use the
funds to exclusively address orphan and abandoned well plugging, repair or replacement
of at-risk bridges, and/or establish greenways and open space (County Commissioner's
Association of Pennsylvania, 2012). In sum, approximately 40 percent of the revenue
collected is allocated to these statewide agencies. The remaining 60 percent is allocated
to counties and municipal governments. Counties with natural gas wells receive the
majority of the funds, though counties without wells but adjacent to production still
receive a portion of the revenue. Funds are not automatically disbursed to counties
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however; county commissioners were required to vote in 2012 to authorize the PUC to
collect the fee and disburse the funds. The amount disbursed to each jurisdiction may not
exceed $500,000 or half of the budget for the prior fiscal year, whichever is greater. With
such a cap in place, the potential for unallocated revenue at the state level exists. The law
stipulates that if unallocated revenue remains, it is to be retained by the commission and
deposited in the Housing Affordability and Rehabilitation Enhancement Fund (Act 13,
2012).
Expenditures by the counties and municipalities are limited to thirteen “spending
categories” defined by the legislation. These categories include but are not limited to uses
such as the “preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and water
supplies; projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing to residents;
and tax reductions including homestead exclusions” (Act 13, 2012). One of the “spending
categories” is actually a capital reserves fund. Thus, all or part of the payment can be
saved using this category. Counties and municipalities are responsible for filing a “fund
usage report” with the Public Utilities Commission by May of 2013 and every subsequent
spring. The revenue must be allocated in any combination within the categories listed on
the report (Act 13, 2012).
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Table 4- Spending Categories Under Act 13

CATEGORY

AMOUNT
(rounded to the nearest
hundred)

1. Construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of roadways,
bridges and public infrastructure.
2. Water, storm water and sewer systems, including construction,
reconstruction, maintenance and repair
3. Emergency preparedness and public safety, including law
enforcement and fire services, hazardous material response, 911,
equipment acquisition and other services
4. Environmental programs, including trails, parks and recreation, open
space, flood plain management, conservation districts and
agricultural preservation
5. Preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and
water supplies
6. Tax reductions, including homestead exclusions
7. Projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing to
residents
8. Records management, geographic information systems and
information technology
9. The delivery of social services
10. Judicial services
11. Deposit into the municipality’s capital reserve fund if the funds are
used solely for a purpose set forth in Act 13 of 2012
12. Career and technical centers for training of workers in the oil and
gas industry
13. Local or regional planning initiatives under the act of July 31, 1968
(P.L. 805, No. 247), known as the Pennsylvania Municipalities
Planning Code
TOTAL

The requirement that counties and municipalities report the allocation of funds
within thirteen state-sanctioned categories lays the groundwork for an analysis of the
decision-making process. In other words, the nature of the law and its record-keeping
requirements should preclude the funds being lost in the general budget for counties in
municipalities in the state. Thus, Pennsylvania provides an excellent opportunity to
examine decision-making processes for resource revenue windfalls, as county
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governments must consciously make decisions as to whether they will save or spend the
funds within a given period of time.
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RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

Given the context of the “boom” and “bust” cycle, a potential for stunted longterm economic growth, and the negative externalities (e.g. environmental degradation,
infrastructural stress) associated with natural resource extraction, identifying the spending
and savings patterns for natural resource windfall payments becomes an important policy
issue. Such funds should be (at least partially) saved, arguably in order to prepare a
municipality for the impending economic “bust” expected with extraction. It is uncertain
to what extent the funds will actually be spent or saved, however. Literature regarding
windfall payments exists in two streams, both of which help to elucidate potential
behaviors of jurisdictions facing windfall payments. One suggests that the decision to
spend or save a windfall is influenced by the actors involved in the decision-making
process as well as numerous external circumstances, such as environmental
consciousness and fiscal stress. Thus, identifying who and what is involved in the
decision-making process proves informative in identifying spending and saving
behaviors. The other stream largely disregards these actors and factors and focuses
primarily on the size of the windfall proportional to overall budget. This stream suggests
that smaller windfalls will be spent while larger windfalls will be saved. Researchers in
this stream attribute such a propensity to the ways in which decision-makers perceive the
windfall. Both streams have potential applicability to the natural gas impact fee funds in
Pennsylvania.
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This study attempted to test the notion advanced by the latter stream, which
argues that windfall size in proportion to total budget is related to a county’s propensity
to consume the payment, while still taking account of the context in which the decision
was made. Following the logic of this stream of literature, counties with a large payout
relative to the size of the overall budget should consider the funds an investment
opportunity and save all or most of the revenue generated. Conversely, counties with
small payouts relative to the size of the overall budget should consider the payment a
‘bonus’ and spend all or most of the funds.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Using a case study design of three Pennsylvania counties which received windfall
payments as cases, this study attempted to determine if a jurisdiction’s propensity to
spend or consume a windfall is related to the size of the payment. Also, this study
attempted to determine if or to what extent various actors or factors influenced the
decision-making process. In each county, interviews with public officials familiar with
the decision-making process for the payment were conducted. Through these interviews
as well as archival materials such as County Commissioner meeting minutes, local
newspaper articles, etc., potential spending and saving patterns were identified.

Case Selection
As mentioned earlier, 35 counties received windfall payments in Pennsylvania in
2012. This study sought to identify three counties, with relatively high, medium, and low
windfall payouts, for examination. In order to do identify which three counties would be
included in the study, a rubric with numerous criteria was established. The first criterion
of the rubric was that each county of interest had received a windfall payment from Act
13 of at least $500,0003. Such a threshold was necessary to filter out counties for whom
the windfall was more or less inconsequential, and therefore not of interest to public
policy. Prior survey research examining the behaviors of municipalities in the Pittsburgh

3

The Act 13 legislation established a cap for the payment of $500,000 or half of a county/municipal
budget, whichever is greater. Windfall payments ranged from approximately $48,000 in Huntingdon
County to about $8.5 million in Bradford County.

47

region suggested a wide range in payment size (some as small as $15), with small
windfalls being spent almost uniformly (Local Government Academy, 2013). Thus, a
sizable payment with a potentially measurable impact was necessary in order to examine
any decision to spend or save the windfall. Of the 35 counties receiving funds, 16
counties received more than $500,000.
The rubric also contained two criteria designed to limit the differences between
counties, and so to control for a wide range of other variables. The first of these was
designed to exclude very small and very large counties, since the issues – and thus the
political environment – faced by these was likely to differ a great deal. Somewhat
arbitrarily, the counties in the study were limited to those with a population between
20,000 and 130,000. Of the 16 counties receiving $500,000 or more, 9 counties fit within
the population parameter. The second criterion to control for unknown differences
between counties was to filter out those counties that were within Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs). Thus, the included counties were relatively self-contained economically
and demographically. After considering the MSA requirement, five counties remained
eligible for inclusion in the study. The counties included Bradford, Clearfield, Greene,
Susquehanna, and Tioga counties.
The five similar counties were then evaluated to see if there was variability in the
size of the windfall relative to their annual budget, in effect looking for variation of the
independent variable in the study. Because budgets were unavailable for all counties at
the time this study was conducted, normalization of the payment by population served as
a proxy measure for the size of the payment in proportion to the overall budget.
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Therefore, the study attempted to include cases in which the windfall size relative to total
budget was low, medium, and high. Of the remaining eligible counties, Bradford, Greene,
Tioga, and Susquehanna Counties had a relatively high windfall per capita while
Clearfield County had a relatively low windfall per capita. Because it has already been
the focus of extensive research relative to fracking activity, Bradford County was
eliminated so as not to encounter research fatigue4. Of the remaining counties, the
windfall per capita was lowest in Clearfield County ($14), with Greene and Susquehanna
Counties in the mid-range at ($81 and $91, respectively) and Tioga County with the
highest windfall per capita ($114).
Ultimately, Clearfield County represented the case in which the windfall relative
to budget was low and Tioga County represented the case in which the windfall relative
to budget was high. Greene County was ultimately determined as the middle case as
Greene County was closer to the mid-range between Clearfield and Tioga Counties and
because Greene County provided geographic breadth to the study (Greene County is in
southwestern Pennsylvania rather than Central Pennsylvania like Clearfield,
Susquehanna, and Tioga Counties). The three cases included in the study are shown
below.
Table 5- Windfall Payments and Population Size

County

Windfall Size

Population

Clearfield
Greene
Tioga

$1,146,000
$3,130,609.68
$4,792,619.48

82,000
39,000
42,000

4

Windfall
per Capita
$14
$81
$114

Bradford County has been the research focus of a number of Sociological studies in the past several
years concerning community change in the face of natural gas resource extraction (Brasher, 2008).
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Research Method
For each county, public officials familiar with Act 13, the impact fee, and the
county’s budget-making process were interviewed. Preliminary research as well as the
websites of each county indicated that the County Commissioners would be of primary
interest (Local Government Academy, 2013). In addition, various news articles and
reports concerning natural gas extraction and the revenue generated by Act 13 were
reviewed in order to learn about the decision-making process for the windfall payment in
each county. News articles were furnished by local newspapers for each of the three
counties and were limited in scope to reports on county meetings5. That is, the articles
which were included in the study were articles reporting on county meetings, such as
those held by the County Commissioners. Whenever possible, county documents
including but not limited to actual County Commissioner meeting minutes and testimony
to the state legislature discussing natural gas were examined as ancillary materials.
The structure of the interviews followed the semi-structured qualitative
interviewing approach advanced in the early works of Rubin and Rubin (1995) and later
Yin (2009) (Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Yin, 2009). This approach allows for the analysis and
interpretation of responses to a fixed set of questions presented to multiple participants.
In this study, respondents were asked a series of 16 open-ended questions over a period
of about 40 minutes. Questions ranged from the importance of Act 13 in the county to
current community conditions.

5

A basic web search for each county yielded a number of local news agencies and outlets. Each
agency/outlet provided an archive of articles for the past several years.
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Before beginning the Clearfield, Greene, and Tioga Counties cases, a pilot
interview was conducted in February 2013 with a public official from Washington
County, Pennsylvania. Washington County received a large payout from Act 13 but was
excluded from this study because it lies within the Pittsburgh MSA. The interview was
used to test the clarity and appropriateness of the questions posed to county officials later
in the study. Results of the pilot interview indicated that the questions were clear and
allowed participants to share a great deal of knowledge about both Act 13 and the
community as a whole. None of the questions initially tested in the pilot were removed
for interviews included in the study.
The interview process with officials from the three counties began in earnest in
March 2013 and was completed by April 2013. Interviews were completed over the
phone. While the conversations were not recorded electronically, conversations were
roughly transcribed. Following each interview, a memo was created that referenced the
notes taken along with impressions of the interview. In total, eight interviews were
completed. Three officials took part in the interview process in Clearfield County, three
officials took part in Greene County, and two officials took part in Tioga County.
Positions held by those interviewed included: county commissioner, planner, economic
development coordinator, conservation district leader, redevelopment authority
chairperson, and GIS coordinator. The level of involvement of various public officials
varied between counties and thus the official titles of interview subjects differed
somewhat from county to county.
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Table 6- Research Materials

County

Interviews Articles Meeting Minutes

Other

Clearfield

3

11

12

--

Greene

3

12

25

Senate Testimony

Tioga

2

23

3

Senate Testimony

Analytical Method
Analysis of the interviews and ancillary materials followed the interpretative
approach suggested by Rubin and Rubin (1995) who have extensive backgrounds in
interviewing public officials, particularly in regard to economic development and public
budgeting (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). As such, the approach emphasizes the importance of
understanding an overall conversation or text and identifying meaning in context. Memos
of each call were coded for concepts which led to the emergence of various themes.
Concepts and themes derived from the interviews were later compared and combined
with concepts and themes derived from the ancillary materials. The process of comparing
and combining the interviews and ancillary materials mirrored the process of axial coding
as described by Saldana (2012).
The process of coding the interviews and ancillary materials was iterative. Only
after meaning could no longer be “wrung out” of the data to support various themes was
the process complete. The diagram below illustrates one example of the process of coding
which took place. Terms like “separate”, “apart”, “extra”, and “bonus” were coded in one
stream of “revenue outside the norm”. Words and phrases like “found”, “given”,
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“appear”, and “unexpected” were coded as another stream of “unearned income”. The
two streams together yielded a dominant theme from the case study regarding the
perception of the windfall as “mad money” (Clark, 2002). Other major themes to emerge
from the data included perceptions of the size of the windfall payment and opinions
regarding the long-term prospects of the natural gas industry and impact fee. These
themes will be discussed in greater detail in later sections pertaining to each county.

Figure 1 Codes related to the theme of “mad money”
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FINDINGS
Case studies of Clearfield, Greene, and Tioga Counties support the arguments
presented in windfall payment literature adapted from behavioral economics. That is,
Tioga County, with a large payout relative to the size of the overall budget planned to
save nearly all of the revenue generated by Act 13. Conversely, Clearfield County, with a
small payout relative to the size of the overall budget, planned to spend most of the
revenue. Additionally, the findings from the interviews reveal that the way in which each
county perceived the windfall as well as perceived the long-term prospects of the industry
as a whole influenced the decision to spend or save the windfall revenue. External actors
and contextual factors were not found to be as critical to the decision-making process, but
that may reflect some limitations to the study. What evidence there is indicates that the
decision-making process involved little public participation and that few external
circumstances ultimately affected the choices made by public officials.

Clearfield County- Small Windfall
Clearfield County lies in the center of Pennsylvania approximately halfway
between Pittsburgh and Harrisburg. The county is traversed by Interstate 80 which runs
east to west through the state. In 2010, the population was just under 82,000 people
(United States Census, 2010). Pennsylvania, which classifies counties by population size,
considers Clearfield a Sixth Class county, making it one of the least populated in the
state. Clearfield includes the Micropolitan Statistical Area of Du Bois which is situated in
the northeastern portion of the county.
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Regional employment relies heavily on manufacturing and the service industries
including retail, food/accommodations, and health and social assistance (United States
Census, 2010). Unemployment as of December 2012 was estimated to be approximately
9.6 percent, nearly two percent higher than the rate for all of Pennsylvania (United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics). Recent economic development initiatives in the county apart
from that associated with Marcellus Shale include the construction of a Wal-Mart
distribution center, a Clearfield extension of Lock Haven University, and a state
correctional facility at Houtzdale (Clearfield County Pennsylvania, 2013).
Natural gas extraction in the county is extensive. According to the most recent
data available from the Department of Environmental Protection, 284 active natural gas
wells exist in Clearfield County (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection,
2013). By number of wells in operation, Clearfield County is within the top ten most
active counties in Pennsylvania. Of those 284 active wells, 142 are located in Lawrence
Township, making Lawrence the largest cluster of drilling in the County (Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, 2013). Outside of this cluster, wells are
sparsely distributed, with extraction spanning from the county border in the west to Du
Bois in the east.
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Figure 2- Map of Natural Gas Wells in Clearfield County (State Impact, 2012)

Returns from the Act 13 natural gas impact fee were received in November 2012.
Clearfield County received $1,146,000, or about $14 per person. Per the new legislation,
allocations of the funds were to be listed on the PUC Fund Usage Report and displayed
on the county’s website. The PUC Fund Usage Report became available in December
2012. The report is displayed below.
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Table 7- Clearfield County PUC Fund Usage Report

CATEGORY

AMOUNT
(rounded to the nearest
hundred)

Construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of roadways, bridges
and public infrastructure.
Water, storm water and sewer systems, including construction,
reconstruction, maintenance and repair
Emergency preparedness and public safety, including law enforcement and
fire services, hazardous material response, 911, equipment acquisition and
other services
Environmental programs, including trails, parks and recreation, open space,
flood plain management, conservation districts and agricultural preservation
Preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and water
supplies
Tax reductions, including homestead exclusions
Projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing to
residents
Records management, geographic information systems and information
technology
The delivery of social services
Judicial services

$0
$0
$212,500

$113,000
$0
$0
$0
$76,700
$300,000
$187,500

Deposit into the municipality’s capital reserve fund if the funds are used
$206,300
solely for a purpose set forth in Act 13 of 2012
Career and technical centers for training of workers in the oil and gas
$0
industry
Local or regional planning initiatives under the act of July 31, 1968 (P.L.
$50,000
805, No. 247), known as the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
TOTAL $1,146,000

The PUC Fund Usage Report shows that none of the payment was withheld—all
funds were deposited into seven of the categories established by the legislation. Of the 13
categories listed on the Fund Usage Report, only one category corresponds to savings.
This category is listed as “Deposit into the municipality’s capital reserve fund if the
funds are used solely for a purpose set forth in Act 13 of 2012”. Clearfield County listed
$206,300 to be deposited into the reserve fund, representing a savings rate of
approximately 18 percent. Conversely, nearly 82 percent of the fund was spent in its first
year for emergency preparedness and public safety, environmental programs, records
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management and GIS, social services, judicial services, and local regional planning
initiatives.

Perception of the Windfall Payment
Analysis of the interviews and ancillary materials from Clearfield County suggest
that the perception of the windfall payment influenced the decision of public officials to
spend, despite an acknowledgement of the need to save the funds. Officials in Clearfield
County also perceived the fund to be an extra source of revenue separate from other
revenue streams. In addition, prospects for long-term engagement of the industry in the
region were uncertain. Because officials perceived the windfall as relatively insubstantial
in terms of size, conceptualized the funds as separate from other funding sources, and felt
uncertain about the future of the industry, spending was more prevalent than saving.
In terms of windfall size, public officials perceived the payment of $1.1 million as
relatively insubstantial. That is, while officials recognized that the payment presented an
opportunity to improve the county’s finances, they admitted that $1.1 cannot be stretched
very far. One public official noted that “people think this is a large sum but depending on
where you are, it really is not”. Consensus in Clearfield County was that the impact or
opportunity associated with the windfall was relative—impacts would vary from recipient
to the recipient—and for Clearfield County, the array of realistic choices for the funds
were narrow. Public officials still maintained, however, that the revenue proved
advantageous.
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Comments made by public officials regarding the size and impact of the windfall
also indicated that the size of the payment was important in deciding to save or spend the
funds. One official noted, “the [larger] the size of the check to the overall budget, the
more discretionary the spending would be. The more you have, the more you would be
able to save for the future”. However, no indications as to how large the check would
have to be to induce greater savings were provided.
In addition to the payment being perceived as small or having limited impact, the
windfall was perceived as something extra or separate from the normal revenue the
county might collect. Officials emphasized the fact that unlike tax revenue, for example,
the impact fee was not to be considered a part of the operating budget for the county to
fulfill its obligations. While public officials conceded that the funds could be used to
supplement the county’s budget when needed, a clear preference to keep the money
separate became apparent.
When asked specifically what should be done with this “extra” money, public
officials were inconsistent in their preferences. Officials emphasized the need to save
while simultaneously providing a list of ways to spend the funds. One respondent named
a host of uses which closely mirrored the actual allocations listed on the usage report.
Another wished to use the funds to cut property taxes so that all residents, with or without
wells, could share in the wealth generated. Another emphasized the need to use the funds
to offset the externalities associated with drilling. All of the respondents, however,
frequently referred to the need to make “updates”, “upgrades”, and “repairs” with the
monies received.
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In some respects, officials spoke of the money from Act 13 as an opportunity for
the county to depart from its reality of fiscal austerity. This year, commissioners were
able to “hold the line” on budgeting by refusing to raise taxes, tap capital reserves, or
issue bonds. The county budget balanced “to the penny” in 2013. However, while
dedicating itself to austerity, one official admitted that the county does not “live high on
the hog”. In an ideal world, officials indicated that the unallocated windfall payment
would be a way for the county to stray away from such austerity and splurge. One way to
splurge was to give everyone in the county a property tax break, an option which was far
outside the realm of possibility given the county’s finances. Thus, allocations of the funds
were much more pragmatic. Clearfield County distributed the funds in seven of the 13
categories defined by the PUC to fund various projects and departments. The payment
made funds available that would not have been otherwise, but represented no major
departure from the fiscal prudence and austerity of the county as a whole.

Prospects for the Industry and the Windfall
In terms of natural gas production and its long-term prospects, officials generally
believed that natural gas production would continue well into the future. Consequently,
returns from the impact fee were also expected for many years to come. Recalling the
long history of timber and coal mining, officials explained that natural gas would not
leave Clearfield County in the near future. However, estimated time horizons for natural
gas extraction varied significantly. Some estimated that natural gas extraction would
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continue for at least 15 years while others estimated extraction would continue as long as
40 years. None of the estimated time horizons were shorter than 10-15 years.
Those interviewed cited a number of pieces of evidence to support the notion that
the industry would remain an important part of the local economy in the future. For
example, sunk costs borne by the gas companies to drill the wells were cited as a reason
to believe natural gas production was a long-term industry. With the cost of establishing a
well near $6 million, as one respondent estimated, the thought of extraction ceasing in the
short-term seemed unrealistic. Officials also mentioned the Utica Shale Formation, a
natural gas play which lies beneath the Marcellus Shale Formation, as another reason to
believe the industry would stay in place. All else held constant, interviewees believed that
the Utica Formation offered stability for the county in the long-run.
Despite such optimism, a number of factors undermined the confidence of the
officials in the long-term prospects of the industry. First, county officials alluded to the
importance of success of activities related to drilling in determining the fate of extraction.
For example, in order for production to continue, officials argued that the construction of
pipelines to distribute the gas was necessary. If the pipelines aren’t constructed,
production and consequently revenue would decline. Throughout the interview, pipelines
became a symbol of future prosperity for Clearfield County. Second, interviewees
expressed concern about natural gas prices. Without a high prevailing price for the
commodity, production has decreased and will continue to do so, potentially forcing gas
companies to abandon the wells altogether. Third, respondents worried that the type of
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gas in Clearfield County, primarily “dry”6 gas, would make their county less attractive to
gas companies and threaten the industry. One respondent concluded that although the
entire county sits atop natural gas, it is not a “sweet spot” for the resource because the gas
below is primarily “dry” rather than “wet”. With these uncertainties or contingencies in
mind, officials remained only “cautiously optimistic” when it came to natural gas in
Clearfield County.
Further contributing to uncertainty regarding the industry and in turn the viability
of the impact fee was the purportedly poor administration of the revenue at the state level.
County officials exhibited a clear distaste if not distrust of the PUC in the collection and
distribution process for the impact fee. With the revenue aggregated at the state level and
re-distributed to counties and municipalities, windfall payments were viewed with
uncertainty. The exact size of the payment for Clearfield County was unclear until late
November 2012 despite the fact that the legislation establishing the fee was enacted in
February 2012. Furthermore, several initial estimates were erroneous. Lawrence
Township within Clearfield County, for example, was given a very low and inaccurate
estimate early-on before receiving a much larger payment months later.
Perception of the size of the windfall, time horizon for the industry, and prospects
for future payments all influenced the decision-making process of Clearfield County to
spend most of the revenue. In terms of size, behavioral economics contends that in the
framework of the mental accounting model, small windfalls, such as the payment
received by Clearfield County, are often considered “bonuses”. Such bonuses are
6

“Dry” gas is free from a number of additional chemicals, such as ethane, whereas “wet” gas is not. In the
current market, “wet” gas commands a higher price than “dry”.
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deposited in mental “mad money” accounts. In the mental accounting framework, in
which funds are non-fungible, money deposited into “mad money” accounts is spent
more freely than money deposited in others. The fact that officials regarded the payment
as extra or separate revenue indicates a prevalence of mental accounting standards by
which such funds would be spent more freely. Combined—perception of the windfall,
outlooks for future prosperity, and uncertainty regarding payments—influenced the
county’s decision to spend a majority of the payment despite the realization that an
inherent advantage to savings exists.

The Context of the Decision-Making Process
However, the political nature of the process was also explored. That is, the
‘actors’ and ‘factors’ were considered in an examination of the decision-making process.
Generally speaking, the decision to spend the revenue invited little public involvement.
The same is true for the county budget as a whole. In fact, one public official noted that
the 2013 Operating Budget was written almost entirely by one member of the Board of
Commissioners.
Public officials explained that in Clearfield County, no public meetings were held
for the sole purpose of soliciting uses for the windfall payment. While the funds were
mentioned at several regularly scheduled County Commissioner meetings, the topic was
not approached in any special sessions. In contrast, various meetings were held at the
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township and borough levels regarding municipal windfall payments. Thus, the decision
to save or spend the windfall was largely insulated from the public at the county level.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the lack of debate concerning the payment, none of
those interviewed could recall any particularly vocal individuals or groups mobilizing
during the decision-making process. The only requests made regarding the funds were
from townships and boroughs. One commissioner noted that the supervisors from
boroughs and townships were “lining up” to receive additional funds from the county to
complete projects. With the exception of the supervisors, external agents such as
lobbyists, interest groups, etc. had little influence on the county’s decision to allocate the
funds.
Moreover, dissatisfaction with natural gas and/or the externalities associated with
extraction were minimized in Clearfield County. While all of those interviewed cited
complaints regarding noise, traffic, and road damage related to extraction as concerns,
few expressed outrage or overwhelming discontent. Rather, officials explained that such
externalities were to be expected given the nature of the industry. In cases where
externalities have proven egregious, interviewees claimed that the county and other levels
of government have worked with the natural gas companies to improve conditions,
potentially loosening up funds from the impact fee for other uses. For example, delivery
schedules for noisy water trucks have been altered to accommodate complaints and the
natural gas companies have repaved or repaired at least some damaged roads.
Similarly, respondents expressed only moderate concern regarding extraction and
the environment. Environmental concerns have been ameliorated by regulations put in
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place by the state. One respondent explained, “in the 50’s and 60’s this area was strip
mine from one end of the county to the other… [The strip mines] made all the creeks run
red from sulfur and people are afraid of a repeat of that situation. But…we have
regulations in place this time. Water is being protected by the state. Science… helps us
out.” Confidence in science, technology, and regulation, then, help to allay environmental
fears in Clearfield County, decreasing the importance of such issues in budgetary
processes. Furthermore, a history of environmental degradation has made the county
more tolerant of such externalities.
Perhaps more influential in the decision to spend the funds was the fiscal reality
of Clearfield County as mentioned earlier. While officials conceptualized the windfall as
a potential opportunity to depart from fiscal austerity, ultimately, the funds were used in
such a way to perpetuate austerity. Officials complained that intergovernmental budget
cuts had created difficulty for the county. One official noted, “They [the state] love to
pass the buck and make us make the tough [budgetary] decisions. We have to make the
[budgetary] decisions here at the local level.” Unfunded mandates by the state became a
popular topic of discussion and were indicative of financial strains faced by the county.
Comments from public meetings revealed that simultaneously there was increased
funding needs for various departments. These increased needs posed a challenge to the
county’s finances. Between 2012 and 2013, for example, the county had anticipated
increased need for Children, Youth, and Family Services. The increase was expected to
be approximately $920,000. Commissioners noted that finding the funds was difficult
without raising taxes. At least part of the need was addressed by funds from Act 13.
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Clearfield County allocated $300,000 specifically to social services presumably in an
effort to close the gap.
However, officials argued that Clearfield County was no worse off than any other
county in the state. In fact, officials argued that Clearfield County was actually in a better
financial situation than some other counties. One official explained that “we are fairly
fortunate that we don’t have any large capital projects that we are paying for. A lot of
these counties are having problems with capital projects that they started funding [a long
time ago] and now have to pay for. We don’t have those here in the county.” Despite
perceived fiscal stress, at least in relative terms, Clearfield County is performing better
than its peers.
Relatively little public input was sought in the windfall payment decision-making
process. As a result, few if any actors outside of the Board of Commissioners influenced
the allocational outcomes. Furthermore, while fiscal stress and budget cuts were
worrisome for county officials, no explicit link between such stress and the allocation of
funds existed. Discontent with extraction and its externalities, including environmental
externalities, was not pervasive within the community. A confidence in science,
technology, and regulations ameliorated concerns in Clearfield County when it came to
environmental degradation. The examination of Clearfield indicated that a majority of the
funds were spent, supporting the contentions of the behavioral economists. Furthermore,
public officials expressed sentiment consistent with the theories of the behavioral
economists, supporting the extension of the theory from the individual level to the public
arena.
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Greene County- Mid-Range Windfall
Greene County is situated in the southwest corner of Pennsylvania and borders
West Virginia both on the eastern and southern sides of the county. The City of
Pittsburgh is approximately 60 miles north of Greene County while Morgantown, WV is
approximately 25 miles south. Interstate 79 cuts through the county from north to south
and connects Morgantown to Pittsburgh. In 2010, the population was just under 39,000
people (United States Census, 2010). In terms of population, Greene County is
approximately the same size as Tioga County (42,000 people) but smaller than Clearfield
County (82,000). Clearfield, Greene, and Tioga Counties are considered Sixth Class
Counties by Pennsylvania, meaning they are some the least populated counties in the
state.
The largest sectors of employment in order of size for Greene County include
education, health, and social assistance; agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing, and
mining; and construction (United States Census, 2010). Unemployment as of December
2012 was estimated to be approximately 7.2 percent, on par for all of Pennsylvania but
lower than Clearfield and Tioga Counties (9.6 and 7.9 percent, respectively) (United
States Bureau of Labor Statistics). In addition to natural gas, Greene County is currently
in the process of expanding its technology industries including high performance
computing and data management.
In terms of natural gas, Greene County has many more wells than Clearfield
County but fewer wells than Tioga County. According to the most recent data available
from the Department of Environmental Protection, 650 active natural gas wells exist in
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Greene County (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 2013). In
comparison, Clearfield County has 284 wells and Tioga County has 1,197 wells. By
number of active wells, Greene County is the sixth most active county in terms of natural
gas production in Pennsylvania. Wells are scattered throughout Greene County with
greater density to the east of Interstate 79. See map below.
Figure 3- Map of Natural Gas Wells in Greene County (State Impact, 2012)

As discussed earlier, the size of the windfall payment in proportion to the 2013
Operating Budget for Greene County is approximately 12.2 percent. The windfall per
capita is $81. In terms of windfall in proportion to the budget and windfall per capita,
Greene County is in the mid-range for this case study. While data pertaining to spending
and saving were unavailable at the time this study was conducted, interviews with public
officials indicated that a majority of the funds would be consumed. In March 2013,
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officials explained that the county had "spent less than half [of the funds], but eventually
all would be spent… there is no anticipation of holding the money back.”

Perception of the Windfall
No pervasive attitude toward the size of the windfall existed. The payment was
neither regarded as substantial nor insubstantial. Indifference toward the size of the
payment juxtaposed the attitude of Clearfield County which was thankful for the revenue,
but felt that possibilities for the funds were limited. Greene County officials embraced the
windfall and argued that they, like any county in Pennsylvania, could use the revenue
given the current state of the economy. There were no perceived limitations or constraints
attached to the revenue as a function of windfall size.
Officials believed that the size of the windfall payment was irrelevant to the
decision-making process because regardless, the funds should ideally be spent rather than
saved. One respondent argued, “I don’t think size influences whether to save or spend
[the money]. I think whether it’s [the payment] 10 bucks or 1,000,000 bucks… [we] will
spend it.” Such an attitude distinguished Greene County from Clearfield County. That is,
Clearfield County exhibited inconsistent preferences for the funds—the county valued
savings but ultimately valued spending more. Greene County, however, consistently
chose spending over saving. Small or large, in absolute or relative terms, officials
emphasized the importance of spending the funds generated by Act 13.
Greene County also did not regard the windfall payment as a “bonus” or “extra
money” to the same extent officials in Clearfield County did. Officials admitted that the
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funds were essentially “newfound” money that wasn’t “expected before 2012” but the
monies from Act 13 were largely undistinguishable from other funds. In other words,
officials did not perceive the impact fee to be separate from normal revenue, like taxes.
Because Greene County perceived the impact fee monies as equivalent to other
revenue streams like taxes, the windfall payment funds were fungible. In other words, the
county was inclined to spend the funds in the same way it would spend any other funds
because there was no special meaning attached to the windfall payment. This utilitarian
view of the funds contrasts with the view in Clearfield County which saw the funds as a
way to depart from the otherwise fiscal modesty of the county. In Greene County, the
funds were just another way to pay the bills. To an extent then, the windfall payment was
viewed as another form of income for the county. As income, the preference to save was
not as pronounced as it was in Clearfield County—there was no inclination to splurge or
be frivolous, only to pay for needed projects.
This helps to explain why officials in Greene County exhibited no hesitation in
deciding whether to spend or save the funds. Consumption of the windfall payment was
the preferred option of county officials. In fact, officials not only preferred spending but
also discouraged saving the funds. Officials were so emphatic that the money should be
spent, one respondent argued, “If you save it, it would need to be saved for a reason. If
you were trying to do a big project, I could see saving it that way you could do a big
project.” Such attitudes support the notion that the funds were considered income. Just as
an individual is induced to save income for special occasions or trips, officials in Greene
County would be induced to save for a special or “big” project.
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Suggested expenditures for the money from Act 13 were wide in scope. Some of
the suggested uses included upgrades to water and sewer lines, paying for repairs to the
Greene County Courthouse roof, alleviating issues with the county’s housing stock, and
repairing some of the county’s bridges. Respondents frequently indicated that the funds
could be used to make upgrades and repairs that have been neglected by the county. In
turn, such upgrades or repairs were seen as an investment for the future. One respondent
commented, “We need water lines and sewer lines [upgraded]. If we don’t have that, we
can’t expand, and there goes taxes.” Similar comments were made by officials throughout
the interview process.
Conversations with officials from Greene County indicated that the county’s
infrastructure was in worse condition than the infrastructure in Clearfield County.
Furthermore, complaints regarding infrastructure from Clearfield County were more
directly tied to externalities, whereas Greene County made it clear that improvements to
water, sewerage, bridges, and roads were needed long before natural gas extraction came
to the county. Thus, pent up demand for such upgrades and repairs existed. The funds
from the impact fee were deemed necessary to alleviate some of these problems.

Prospects for the Industry and the Payment
Like Clearfield County, long-term prospects for the natural gas industry and
future payments from Act 13 were uncertain. Officials argued that the Utica Shale
Formation would ensure that natural gas extraction would continue for years to come.
However, such statements were undermined by a number of factors just as they were in
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Clearfield County. Price variability of natural gas worried officials in Greene County as
did available technology. Even if the Utica Formation offered additional natural gas
reserves, technology, or the ability to retrieve the gas concerned Greene County. One
official declared, “I don’t think it’s [extraction] going to go anywhere… [but] It
[extraction] depends on the price of gas is and if it’s something they can get to… It’s all
based on technology.” Another official indicated that natural gas would be lucrative in
the future, but that there may be “leveling off” as time goes on. In other words,
production would continue, but at a decreasing rate of growth. None of the officials
offered specific estimates as to how long natural gas extraction would continue. Officials
in Clearfield County provided a wide range of estimates from 15 to 40 years whereas as
officials in Greene County used only generalities in describing the time horizon for future
extraction.
Greene County also noted the importance of related industries to the success of
the natural gas extraction in the long-run. While natural gas prices and available
technology worried Greene County, so did the completion of pipelines and establishment
of compressor stations to transport natural gas. These industries were collectively referred
to as “downstream industries”. Officials used downstream industries as evidence that
natural gas would be an important part of the economy in the future. However, officials
also warned that if downstream industries failed to develop, Greene County and
Pennsylvania as a whole would be endowed with natural gas reserves and no way to
transport the gas to market. The future of natural gas was contingent upon the
development of these downstream industries.
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With uncertainty regarding the industry as a whole came uncertainty regarding the
payout from Act 13. Unlike Clearfield County, officials in Greene County were confident
in the state in the collection and administration of the impact fee. However, Greene
County expressed concerns regarding the variability of the payout due to price variability.
Officials noted that because the impact fee is not a flat rate but instead based on a number
of variables, including number of wells drilled and the average annual price of gas, there
would inevitably be uncertainty regarding the funds. One official noted that the county
had its “hands in the air” because it did not know what future payouts may be. In other
words, the county was ambivalent regarding the future of the payments and thus hesitant
to rely upon the revenue.
In terms of the perception of the windfall payment, Greene County differed from
Clearfield County. Officials in Greene County appreciated the extra funds and did not
perceive the funds to be too small or insubstantial like officials in Clearfield County did.
Thus the county intended to spend all or most of the funds in the first year, as though it
were income. Given the poor state of community infrastructure even before Marcellus
Shale development, spending the revenue, in totality, was necessary.

The Context of the Decision-Making Process
Similar to Clearfield County, the decision-making process for the windfall
payment was largely unaffected by citizens, interest groups, or lobbyists. Respondents
had no memory of any particular groups or individuals being active or vocal about ways
to spend the impact fee funds. Further, respondents could not recall the county holding

73

any meetings in regard to the windfall payment. Reports of County Commissioner
meetings indicate that shortly after estimates of the payment were provided, county
commissioners announced a number of potential uses for the funds. Thus, the
commissioners had already contemplated uses for the payment even before the public
became aware of the payment, effectively excluding citizens from the decision-making
process. The only public meetings regarding uses for the payment that respondents could
recall were at the borough and township levels, and dealt with payouts to those
jurisdictions. More specifically, townships and boroughs solicited input from citizens in
regard to the windfalls received by the townships and boroughs.
Also, much like in Clearfield County, officials believed that Greene County was
facing a budget crunch or fiscal stress. However, respondents pointed out that they were
no worse off than any other county in the state. One official noted, “This County is in
decent shape… We’re in the black and [we’re] in decent financial shape. It’s not one [a
county] where we aren’t sure if we will stay open tomorrow.” Compared to other
counties, then, Greene County was not perceived to be in a dire financial situation.
In discussing the budget crunch and the financial state of the county, officials
complained about upper-level budget cuts and unfunded mandates established by the
state. The most prominent complaint regarded the county’s conservation district funding.
Officials explained that conservation districts received no funding in the 2013 State of
Pennsylvania Budget despite having an increased workload. One official opined “The
problem is the conservation district is delegated to hand out permits for these [natural
gas] developments (gathering lines, stream crossings etc.) but they are not getting funding

74

now and so they have to make up money other ways.” Other officials complained that
upper-level cuts in grant-funding, from Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for
example, have been cut. Such cuts undermined the county’s various initiatives,
particularly for affordable and improved housing.
Complaints regarding housing were numerous. According to Greene County
officials, housing stock has been in poor condition for years and the natural gas boom has
only exacerbated the problem. An official stated, “Housing has been taken by Marcellus
workers and so rents have gone up and there is more demand… it’s sort of created a
housing shortage or perceived housing shortage because they [transient workers] have
taken vacant spaces. The workers for Marcellus shale have taken lower quality housing
from the poor especially.” Another official claimed that workers who had migrated to
work for the natural gas companies had filled the county’s mobile home parks and a
number of hotels in the area to capacity. Consequently, the county is desperately trying to
keep up with immediate housing demand and externalities associated with extraction
rather than those in the future.
Other than housing, officials noted that some discontent in the community has
been caused by traffic, noise, and deterioration of the roads because of Marcellus Shale
activity. In Waynesburg, the county seat, water trucks traveling through the town made it
difficult to have a conversation on the street corner. Elsewhere, dust had become an issue
with local residents. By far the most serious complaint was with the deterioration of
roads, however. Various parts of the county had poor roads and bridges before natural gas
extraction began. Since, the condition of these roads and bridges has only worsened.
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Still, opposition to development was scant. None of the externalities identified had
precipitated a backlash from the community at large.
In terms of the environment, the consequences of natural gas extraction were
unclear, but there was fear regarding what the environmental impacts might be. One
official lamented, “There is concern [for the environment]. To what extent there is [a
threat], I don’t think anyone has figured it out. We are afraid 15 years from now we will
all be dead. It feels like we’re chasing the impacts instead of meeting them head on. We
definitely are reactive, not proactive.” While officials expressed a general uneasiness
about the environment and natural gas, they pinpointed specific concern for water and
water quality. Citizens worried that natural gas extraction would destroy the county’s
streams, rivers, and drinking water. One official noted that, “we have individuals who
belong to groups and organizations for streams and stream protection and they go out to
test streams and they realize the issues [with water quality] right away.” The county
expressed interest in educational outreach regarding water quality testing protocols and
documenting water quality issues. By educating the public about water testing, officials
believed that it would be easier to establish proof that natural gas was affecting water
quality in the county.
The political factors identified by the literature on public budgeting did not prove
particularly important in the case of Greene County. Political mobilization and/or
participation were unimportant or at least not memorable to those interviewed.
Externalities associated with natural gas extraction were topics of discussion but had not
precipitated a flurry of activity to stop the extraction companies, hold the companies
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accountable, or use the funds to address the externalities. The only issues which did prove
pertinent were fiscal stress and budget cuts. However, officials in Greene County, much
like in Clearfield County, did not perceive their own fiscal situation to be worse than
anywhere else.
Greene County intended to spend most of the windfall payment which does not
fit entirely within the theoretical framework established by behavioral economics.
However, the County also evinced different attitudes about the money, namely that is was
the same as normal income. Keeler et. al (1985) found that such a perception exists when
windfall payments are proportionally neither large or small. In other words, Keeler et. al
(1985) contend that medium-sized windfalls are spent as normal income. Thus, findings
from Greene County lend support to Keeler et. al (1985) but does not fit well within the
greater framework.

Tioga County- Large Windfall
Tioga County is in north-central Pennsylvania along the Pennsylvania-New York
border. Harrisburg, PA is approximately 140 miles to the south while Scranton, PA is
approximately 120 miles to the east. In 2010, the population was slightly higher than
42,000 people (United States Census, 2010). Tioga County is more populated than
Greene County (39,000 people) but approximately half as populated as Clearfield County
(82,000 people). Tioga County, like Greene and Clearfield Counties, is one of the least
populated in the state.
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Education, healthcare, and social assistance; manufacturing; and retail trade are
the largest sectors of employment in Tioga County (United States Census, 2010).
Unemployment as of December 2012 was estimated to be approximately 7.9 percent,
near the rate for all of Pennsylvania but slightly higher than Greene County (7.2 percent)
and below the rate of unemployment for Clearfield County (9.6 percent) (United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics). Recent economic development initiatives in Tioga County
apart from Marcellus Shale development include the establishment of a 17.6 acre
business park and re-development of a former tannery site for recreation.
In terms of natural gas, Tioga County is the second most active county for natural
gas in the state. According to the Department of Environmental Protection, 1,197 active
natural gas wells exist in Tioga County (Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection, 2013). Active wells are distributed throughout the county with few locales
remaining untouched.
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Figure 4- Map of Natural Gas Wells in Tioga County (State Impact, 2012)

In November 2012, Tioga County received $4,792,619.48, or $114 per capita,
from the natural gas impact fee established by Act 13. The PUC Fund Usage Report
listing the allocations of the funds became available in March 2012. The report is
displayed below. Of the payment, Tioga County chose to spend only $36,520 of the funds
for emergency preparedness and public safety issues. Thus, consumption accounted for
only 1 percent of the windfall. Important to note, however, is that Tioga County’s savings
is not accounted for in the capital reserves category of the PUC Fund Usage Report.
Rather, officials interpreted the legislation in such a way so as to allow the county to
withhold spending of the payment altogether. The remaining balance for Tioga County’s
windfall payment is $4,756,099.48.
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Table 8- PUC Fund Usage Report for Tioga County

CATEGORY

AMOUNT
(rounded to the nearest
hundred)

Construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of roadways, bridges
and public infrastructure.
Water, storm water and sewer systems, including construction,
reconstruction, maintenance and repair
Emergency preparedness and public safety, including law enforcement and
fire services, hazardous material response, 911, equipment acquisition and
other services
Environmental programs, including trails, parks and recreation, open space,
flood plain management, conservation districts and agricultural preservation
Preservation and reclamation of surface and subsurface waters and water
supplies
Tax reductions, including homestead exclusions
Projects to increase the availability of safe and affordable housing to
residents
Records management, geographic information systems and information
technology
The delivery of social services
Judicial services

$0
$0
$36,520

$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

Deposit into the municipality’s capital reserve fund if the funds are used
$0
solely for a purpose set forth in Act 13 of 2012
Career and technical centers for training of workers in the oil and gas
$0
industry
Local or regional planning initiatives under the act of July 31, 1968 (P.L.
$0
805, No. 247), known as the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
TOTAL
$36,520

Perception of the Windfall Payment
The windfall payment represented nearly 25 percent of the county’s 2013
Operating Budget. Of the three counties included in this study, Tioga County received the
largest payout in both relative and absolute terms. Despite the large relative size of the
payment, officials did not recognize the windfall as having a major influence on the
county’s finances. Rather, Tioga County had managed without the impact fee in the past
and planned to do so in the future. Tioga County in comparison to Clearfield and Greene
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Counties thus exhibited mild indifference toward the revenue. Clearfield County was
grateful for the funds but ultimately felt that limited opportunities existed because the
size of the windfall payment was insubstantial. Greene County felt that any payment,
large or small, presented an opportunity to alleviate pent up need for various projects and
should be spent. Tioga County, however, maintained that the windfall payment was large
and existed outside of the normal realm of fiscal decision-making processes and thus,
should be saved for later use.
Like in Clearfield County, officials in Tioga County indicated that the funds were
“separate” from normal revenue. However, a subtle difference in the perception of the
funds between the two counties existed. While Clearfield County approached these
separate funds as a “bonus” or “newfound” source of money, Tioga County approached
the funds as an endowment. This is not to say that Tioga County specifically planned to
invest the funds and accumulate interest; rather, the county perceived the payment as a
sum of money bestowed upon it to be kept mostly intact, with only small, occasional
withdraws.
Consequently, officials were emphatic that the funds not be consumed without
careful consideration. Respondents explained that the county was already “conservative”
with its finances and that the conservatism used to approach the operating budget had
carried over in the management of funds from Act 13. In some respects, oversight had
become more important if not stricter in respect to the windfall payment. The county and
its officials considered themselves to be stewards of the impact fee revenue and as such
emphasized extreme caution in how the funds were spent. One official explained that the
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county was “obligated to manage those dollars… we [the county] need to be careful… we
need to manage this money.” Another explained, “we didn’t plant [natural gas], didn’t
grow it, it’s a gift—so [we] manage it [and the funds generated by it].”
In exercising caution, the preference for the funds generated by Act 13 was to
save. Whereas Clearfield County exhibited inconsistent preferences—a desire to save
while simultaneously consuming—and Greene County consistently preferred to spend,
Tioga County was the only county to prefer to save the funds generated by the new law.
Savings represented an opportunity for the county to promote economic growth and
development in the future. Officials noted that it was the economic growth and
development introduced by such investments that would mitigate the negative effects of
natural gas extraction in the community.
While officials did not advance this argument, it stands to reason that a focus on
savings and re-investment may help to soften the future bust of the natural gas industry in
the future. Tioga County received the largest windfall payment because it was most
active in terms of production. Arguably, then, the bust will be greatest in Tioga County.
Therefore, savings could help ameliorate some of the ramifications of the impending
bust. Of the three counties, then, Tioga should be preparing for the impending bust.

Prospects of the Industry and the Payment
In terms of long-term prospects for the industry and windfall payment, Tioga
County, like the other two counties, expressed concern. All respondents agreed that
natural gas extraction “will be around for a long time.” However, officials qualified such
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remarks. One official commented that they were already worried because there had
already been a decline in the number of new wells drilled. Similarly, officials were
uncertain about the future of the windfall payment. One public official, like in Greene
County, worried for the conservation districts because in the state budget, funding had
been cut. If revenue from the impact fee drops off, officials worried that the conservation
districts might be in a difficult position.
Officials in Tioga County expressed additional concern for the long-term viability
of businesses which have been spawned as a result of Marcellus development. The
official claimed that businesses were still opening, but presumably if the natural gas
industry slows, such growth will stagnate if not contract. Thus, there was a concern for
overall economic health of the community (and the state) rather than a concern for natural
gas and windfall payment alone.

The Context of the Decision-Making Process
Like the other counties, external actors were largely absent from the decisionmaking process. One respondent concluded that the allocation of the funds was solely the
responsibility of the Board of Commissioners, with little public input. Comments were
made about the impact fee at regularly scheduled meetings of the Board of
Commissioners, but no special sessions were held to gauge public support for any
initiatives. Furthermore, none of the respondents could recall the involvement of any
particular citizens, groups, or lobbyists in the allocation of the funds. The public had been
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so disengaged in the decision-making process, one public official noted, “Overall it’s
been quiet. I don’t know how many people know we are getting money.” In all three
counties, the decision-making process for the windfall payment proved largely apolitical,
with the choice falling primarily on the shoulders of county officials.
Fiscal stress also did not prove particularly influential in the decision to save the
windfall payment received, just as it did not prove influential in Clearfield and Greene
Counties. While officials complained of unfunded mandates and tough economic
conditions, officials felt that the Tioga County was no better or worse off than other
counties in Pennsylvania or across the United States. News reports did indicate that in
Tioga County the 2013 Operating Budget did not include a cost of living increase for
retirees, the first time in at least three years that there was no increase. Such a move
indicates some level of fiscal stress, or concern for the balance of the county’s budget.
However, at the same time, the county chose not to increase taxes this year.
Like Clearfield and Greene Counties, complaints regarding traffic, noise, and road
quality were common in Tioga County. Unfortunately, Tioga County also has one of the
highest percentages of dirt and gravel roads of any county in Pennsylvania, exacerbating
road quality issues in the face of natural gas extraction. Officials also complained that
community services had been hit hard by Marcellus Shale development. The influx of
workers in particular had made it difficult for Tioga County to provide an adequate level
of social and community services. However, officials noted that the industry has been and
will continue to be a good partner for the county to improve roads, services, etc.

84

While a concern for the environment and the effect that natural gas extraction
might have on the environment are important to Tioga County, one official noted that
such concerns have reached a saturation point. That is, citizens are fatigued by the debate
regarding extraction and the environment. Consequently, there are relatively few calls to
take environmental action. Another official noted that the most vehement opposition to
extraction and strongest calls for environmental action has not come from Tioga County,
Pennsylvania but instead from neighboring counties in New York. On more than one
occasion, New Yorkers have swarmed Tioga County to complain about water pollution
and extraction. One interview subject mentioned that New Yorkers have become
concerned that dairy products from Tioga County are being tainted by the water the cows
drink.

A Discussion of the Findings from Clearfield, Greene, and Tioga Counties
The literature concerning individuals and households’ propensity to spend
windfalls suggests that windfall payments are often consumed in inverse proportion to the
size of the windfall to total income (Keeler, James, & Abdel-Ghany, 1985; Landsberger,
1966). In other words, individuals are generally more likely to spend windfalls that are
small and save those that are large. This study sought to test such assertions by observing
the behaviors of three Pennsylvania Counties which received windfall payments from
natural gas impact fee revenue.
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Before this study, such findings had not been tested on collective decision-making
situations. In this study, the collective decision-making was at the county level for
revenue from the natural gas impact fee. Results of this study indicate that decisions
about windfall s at the county level are similar to those at the individual or household
level. Clearfield County received the smallest windfall relative to its budget and spent
most of the windfall. Greene County received a medium windfall relative to its budget
and also intended to spend most of the payment. Tioga County, which received the
largest windfall relative to its budget, planned to save nearly the entire windfall.
In explaining why individuals tend to spend small windfalls and save large
windfalls, Thaler (1985), Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Milkman et. al (2007) argue that
individuals establish various “mental accounts” designated for spending or saving in
which small, one-time windfall gains are deposited into a “mad money” to spend more
freely. Conversely, large windfalls are deposited in more stringently regulated mental
accounts. Interviews and ancillary materials from the three counties indicate that a
“mental accounting” system described by Thaler (1985), Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and
Milkman et. al (2007) existed at the municipal level as the counties faced the windfall
payment. The small windfall in Clearfield County was perceived as a “bonus” and was
spent more freely. The larger windfall in Greene County was perceived as income, but
ultimately spent freely. However in Tioga County, where the payment was largest, nearly
all of the payment was perceived as an endowment and was saved.
Keeler et. al (1985) as well as Arkes et. al (1994) further argue that when a
windfall occurs without warning and is unexpected to occur again, spending is more

86

likely (Arkes, Joyner, Pezzo, Nash, Siegel-Jacobs, & Stone, 1994; Keeler, James, &
Abdel-Ghany, 1985). The study of the three counties in Pennsylvania supports such
claims to an extent. All three counties expressed concern regarding the future of natural
gas and the impact fee payment. Therefore, the counties were not certain as to whether or
not windfalls would be received in the future, at least partially supporting the
qualifications made by Keeler et. al (1985) and Arkes et. al (1994). Further, the size of
the windfall payment was uncertain because of the variability in the payment formula.
The other stream concerning windfalls, adapted primarily from public budgeting,
proved largely inapplicable in this case study. Factors identified in the literature such as
discontent as a result of drilling and environmental concern appeared to have little if any
influence on the decision of the counties to save or spend the windfall. Intergovernmental
budget cuts and fiscal stress were more germane to the budget decision-making process,
however, the fiscal situation in each county was perceived to be fair. None of the counties
emphasized that fiscal constraints had significantly influenced their decision to spend or
save the windfall payment.
This phenomenon became apparent after examining the PUC Fund Usage Report
for Clearfield and Tioga Counties which became available over the course of this study.
The PUC Fund Usage Report was unavailable for Greene County at the time this study
was conducted. The reports indicated that Clearfield County, which received the smallest
windfall payment in absolute and relative terms (approximately $1.1 million and 5.4
percent of the overall budget, respectively), spent 82 percent of the initial windfall
payment. Tioga County, which received the largest windfall payment in absolute and
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relative terms ($4.8 million and 25 percent, respectively) spent a mere 1 percent of the
payment. Without the PUC Fund Usage Report for Greene County, exact numbers were
unavailable; however, officials indicated that the County planned to most if not all of the
funds in the first year.

Table 9- Comparison of County Spending Patterns

County

Windfall Size

Total Operating
Budget 2013

Clearfield
Greene
Tioga

$1,146,000
$3,130,609.68
$4,792,619.48

$21,101,651
$25,765,478.38
$19,600,000
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% of
Operating
Budget
5.4 percent
12.2 percent
24.5 percent

Windfall
per Capita

%
Consumption

$14
$81
$114

82%
NA
1%

CONCLUSION

Natural resource extraction presents nations, states, and communities with an
opportunity to ‘get rich quick’. Such an opportunity, however, has the potential for
significant infrastructural and environmental costs in addition to the potential for poor
overall economic performance in the long-run. To mitigate these issues, nations, states,
and communities tax natural resource extraction, as discussed earlier. Some take an
additional step to ensure future economic stability by establishing a special fund for the
revenue.
Internationally, a number of nations, including Mexico and Indonesia, have
successfully established special savings accounts or legacy funds (sometimes called
permanent funds) for natural resource revenues (Usui, 1997). In the United States,
Alaska, Montana, and New Mexico, among others have also established such accounts
(Patton, Taxing Fracking: Proposals for Ohio's Severance Tax, 2012). The purpose of
these funds is to provide a source of revenue after natural resource endowments have
been exhausted (Central Appalachia Regional Network, 2012). Furthermore, a number of
the accounts stipulate that the funds be used to promote economic diversification as a
means to mitigate the effects of impending resource busts (Central Appalachia Regional
Network, 2012).
While detractors of such funds argue that mismanagement and corruption make
the funds ineffective, there have been several successes. Proponents of the establishment
of legacy or permanent funds often point to conditions or regulations for usage of the
funds as keys to success. The most prominent of these conditions or regulations is to limit
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the amount of the fund that can be withdrawn annually. In Norway, for example, funds
for oil and natural gas have an annual maximum withdrawal rate of 4 percent. By
establishing the limit, Norway ensures that the wealth generated by extraction can be
sustained for a longer period of time. Also, the limit minimized the currying of political
favors associated with expenditures. In other words, the politicization of the fund was
decreased by capping the withdrawal into a smaller annual amount. (Farren, Weinstein, &
Partridge, 2012).
Savings, whether in a permanent fund or other account, would provide
Pennsylvania with an opportunity to save all or a portion of the wealth generated by
natural gas to mitigate the impending resource bust. Such a fund could provide cash in an
emergency and/or be used to promote economic development and diversification. Given
proper management of the funds, Pennsylvania could dampen or ameliorate the effects of
the boom and bust cycle associated with natural resource extraction.
An analysis of the decision to spend or save windfall payments from natural gas
revenues in Clearfield, Greene, and Tioga Counties supported the assertions made by the
stream of literature adapted from behavioral economics. That is, this study supported the
notion that the size of a windfall in proportion to a county’s total budget influences the
decision to spend or save the payment. Clearfield County, which received the smallest
payment relative to the 2013 Operating Budget consumed approximately 82 percent of
the windfall while Tioga County, which received the largest payment relative to the 2013
Operating Budget, consumed a mere 1 percent of the payment. Figures were unavailable
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for Greene County, although conversations with public officials indicated that the county
planned to spend rather than save the windfall payment.
Determining how governing bodies would behave in the face of a windfall
payment has important public policy implications. With economic risk and various
negative externalities associated with resource extraction, the decision to spend or save
revenue generated by Act 13 may have a significant impact on the health and viability of
a community in the future. As argued in the section regarding legacy and permanent
funds, savings are a tool for nations, states, and communities to mitigate the impending
resource bust associated with natural resource extraction. Thus, governing bodies should
be encouraged to save at least a portion of proceeds from extractive activity. Given the
knowledge of windfall size in the public budgeting arena and how jurisdictions perceive
windfalls relative to size, work can begin helping jurisdictions to alter the perception of
such payments. In doing so, states, counties, and municipalities can better realize
opportunities and advantages associated with savings. For example, communities may be
able to better mitigate the future impacts or externalities associated with extraction rather
than addressing only immediate impacts.
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